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ARTICLES
A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA?
CONFUSION IN CANADA IN CARTER
JOHN KEOWN*
In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), Justice Lynn Smith held that
the Canadian Criminal Code’s prohibitions on murder and assisting suicide
infringe Sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to
the extent that those prohibitions outlaw voluntary, active euthanasia and physi-
cian-assisted suicide.  This Article suggests the judgment is defective in at least
four key respects: misunderstanding the principle of the inviolability of human
life; concluding that laws against assisting suicide discriminate against those
physically incapable of committing suicide; evading the logical “slippery slope”
argument; and (as the Irish High Court has since concluded in Fleming v.
Ireland) misinterpreting the evidence from jurisdictions with relaxed laws.
Although the judgment of Justice Smith has been reversed by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, the reversal turned on questions of constitutional law, not on
these four criticisms.  These criticisms remain important, not least as the case is to
be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the ongoing public policy debate about whether
voluntary euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide should be decriminal-
ized is the question whether they could be effectively controlled.  Could
a relaxed law achieve the degree of control and protection that is war-
ranted by the importance of the rights and interests to be protected,
and that has regularly been accepted by proponents of decriminaliza-
tion to be desirable, and asserted by them to be attainable, in virtue of
safeguards stipulated in their various proposals?
In Carter v. Canada,1 a first instance decision in the Supreme Court
of British Columbia, Justice Lynn Smith found a right to voluntary
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in Sections seven and fifteen
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Her holding hangs
to a large extent on her controversial factual finding that the evidence
* Rose F. Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics,
Georgetown University.  M.A., University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford;
Ph.D., University of Cambridge. Formerly Senior Lecturer in Law in the Faculty of Law in
the University of Cambridge, Fellow of Queens’ College, Cambridge, and Senior
Research Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge.  In Carter v. Canada (Att’y General),
[2012] B.C.S.C. 886 (Can. B.C.), the author served as an expert witness for the Attorney
General of Canada.
1. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 (Can. B.C.).  The judg-
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2 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
from jurisdictions which have relaxed their laws shows that the risks of
decriminalization “can be very largely avoided through carefully-
designed, well-monitored safeguards.”2
Section 241 of the Canadian Criminal Code prohibits counseling,
aiding, or abetting suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, with impris-
onment for up to fourteen years.3  Section 222(1) of the Code provides
that a person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any
means, he causes the death of a human being,4 and Section 222(4)
provides that culpable homicide is murder, manslaughter or infanti-
cide.5  Section 14 states that no person is entitled to consent to have
death inflicted upon him and that such consent does not affect the
criminal responsibility of any person by whom death may be inflicted.6
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
provides:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.7
Section 15(1) states:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.8
  Justice Smith held that the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringes Sec-
tion 15 to the extent that it prohibits a medical practitioner from assist-
ing suicide where the assistance is provided in the context of a
“physician-patient relationship” to a “fully-informed, non-ambivalent
competent adult patient” who is “free from coercion and undue influ-
ence”; is not “clinically depressed” and personally requests such assis-
tance; is “materially physically disabled or is soon to become so”; has
been diagnosed with a “serious illness, disease or disability”; is in “a state
of advanced weakening capacities with no chance of improvement”;
who has an illness that is “without remedy” as determined by treatment
options “acceptable to the person,” and the illness is causing “enduring
physical or psychological suffering” that is “intolerable” to that person
and which cannot be alleviated by medical treatment “acceptable to
that person.”9
The judge also declared that the Criminal Code unjustifiably
infringes Section 7 in two additional respects.  It infringes that section
2. Id. at para. 10.
3. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 241 (Can.).
4. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, § 222(1) (Can.).
5. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, § 222(4) (Can.).
6. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, § 14 (Can.).
7. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 7 (U.K.).
8. Id. at § 15(1).






      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 7 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE101.txt unknown Seq: 3  7-MAY-14 15:32
2014] A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA? 3
even if the patient is not “materially physically disabled or is soon to
become so” and to the extent that it prohibits “consensual physician-
assisted death.”10  The plaintiffs defined “consensual physician-assisted
death” as involving “the administration of medication or other treat-
ment that intentionally brings about a patient’s death by the act of a
medical practitioner. . . .”11  This clearly goes beyond assisting a patient
to commit suicide and includes the active, intentional ending of a
patient’s life, in other words, voluntary, active euthanasia.  The plain-
tiffs’ definition was adopted by the judge.12  In short, the judge held
that the Code’s prohibitions on both physician-assisted suicide and on
voluntary euthanasia infringe the Charter.  She suspended the effect of
her declarations for one year to allow Parliament time to enact legisla-
tion which would accommodate her ruling.13
Déjà vu?  Indeed.  Twenty years ago the Supreme Court of Canada
rejected a right to physician-assisted suicide in Rodriguez v. British Colum-
bia, albeit by a bare majority.14  However, Justice Smith thought that a
new principle of disproportionality had since emerged, that fresh
empirical evidence from jurisdictions with relaxed laws was available,
that the situation of some of the plaintiffs differed from that of the
plaintiff in Rodriguez, and that she was therefore free to reconsider the
issue.15  Canada’s appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, which held that no new principle of disproportionality had
emerged since Rodriguez, and that the decision of the Supreme Court in
that case was binding.16
Prescinding from issues of constitutional law, this Article offers
four key criticisms of the judgment of Justice Smith, criticisms which
were not made by the Court of Appeal.  These criticisms remain valid
and relevant, particularly as the case is to be heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada.
The Article maintains that the judgment of Justice Smith, a judg-
ment which is out of line with decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada,17 the Supreme Court of the United States,18 the House of
Lords,19 the European Court of Human Rights,20 the Supreme Court
10. Id. at para. 1393b.
11. Id. at para. 23.  For their definition of “grievously and irremediably ill” see id. at
para. 24.
12. The judge narrowed the definition to “competent, fully-informed, non-ambiva-
lent adult persons” who were free from undue influence and clinical depression and who
personally requested physician-assisted death; to require “grievously and irremediably ill”
persons to be in “an advanced state of weakening capacities, with no chance of improve-
ment”, and to exclude “psychosocial suffering” and the provision of assistance by non-
physicians. See id. at para. 1387-91.
13. Id. at para. 1399.
14. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att’y General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.)
15. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. at para. 1001–03.
16. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2013] B.C.C.A. 435 (B.C., Can.).
17. Rodriguez, [1993] 3 S.C.R at 581.
18. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997).
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4 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
of Ireland21—and with the conclusions of the vast majority of expert
committees and legislatures which have considered, across seventy-five
years,22 whether voluntary euthanasia could safely be decriminalized—
is seriously defective.
The Article considers four of the judgment’s central flaws:
1. Its failure accurately to appreciate and affirm the fundamental
legal principle of the inviolability of human life, a principle which has
historically provided a bright line between, on the one hand, intention-
ally ending the lives of patients (euthanasia) and, on the other, treat-
ment aimed at palliation, and the withdrawal of treatments because
they are futile or excessively burdensome, where the shortening of life
is foreseen;
2. Its holding that the prohibition on assisting suicide discriminates
against those physically unable to commit suicide;
3. Its evasion of the important argument that, once the inviolability
principle is abandoned by the endorsement of voluntary euthanasia,
such endorsement logically entails the endorsement of non-voluntary
euthanasia (that is, the intentional termination of incompetent patients
like infants or those with advanced dementia); and
4. Its erroneous finding that the experience of jurisdictions with
relaxed laws shows that the risks of decriminalization “can be very
largely avoided through carefully-designed, well-monitored
safeguards.”23
I. THE INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE
The principle of the inviolability of life is a fundamental principle
of the common law.24  The principle has historically been referred to as
the “sanctity of life,” but as this Article is concerned with a philosophi-
cal, rather than a theological principle, the phrase “inviolability of life”
will be used to avoid any distracting theological connotations.  As Lord
Goff noted in Airedale N.H.S. Trust  v. Bland, the principle has long been
recognized in most, if not all, civilized societies throughout the modern
world as is evident from Article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.25
20. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 1 (2002).
21. Fleming v. Ireland, [2013] I.E.S.C. 19 (Ir.).  Delivering the judgment of the
Irish Supreme Court in Fleming, Chief Justice Denham noted that Carter “is not consistent
with many judgments from supreme and constitutional courts of other nations.” Id. at
para. 74.
22. The Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society was founded in the UK in 1935
and the Euthanasia Society of America in 1938. IAN DOWBIGGIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
EUTHANASIA 80–82 (2007).  In the UK, from 1936 to 2009, Parliament has rejected a suc-
cession of proposals to relax the law. Id. at 145; JOHN KEOWN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
MEDICINE: ESSAYS ON THE INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE 304 (2012).
23. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, para. 10 (Can. B.C.).
24. See KEOWN, supra note 22, at chapter 1.
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2014] A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA? 5
The principle is grounded in an understanding of each human
being as having an intrinsic and ineliminable dignity.  The essence of
the principle is the prohibition on the intentional taking of human life,
intention used in its ordinary sense of aim or purpose.26  The House of
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (one of the several expert
committees which have carefully examined, and rejected, the case for
voluntary euthanasia) described the prohibition on intentional killing
as “the cornerstone of law and of social relationships” which “protects
each one of us impartially, embodying the belief that all are equal.”27
The principle is clearly central to the question whether the law should
be relaxed to permit voluntary, active euthanasia (currently the crime
of murder) and physician-assisted suicide (currently the crime of assist-
ing suicide).
The judgment of Justice Smith fails, however, to exhibit an accu-
rate understanding of the principle; to recognize its foundational
importance in the law; to provide anything approaching a reasoned
case for rejecting it; and to appreciate that its rejection cannot logically
be confined to the circumstances her judgment adumbrates.
The starting point of the judgment should have been a clear
acknowledgment that historically the law has been profoundly shaped
by recognition of the intrinsic worth of the life of each human being
and the principle that it is always wrong to intentionally kill innocent
human beings (that is, those not involved in unjust aggression).  The
judgment should also have made clear that, while this principle rules
out euthanasia and assisting suicide, it permits the palliation of symp-
toms, and the withdrawal of futile or excessively burdensome treat-
ments, even if the hastening of death is foreseen as a side-effect.28
The key distinction between intending, and merely foreseeing, the
hastening of death was clearly endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Rodriguez.29  Delivering the judgment of the majority, Justice
Sopinka rejected the argument that assisting suicide was similar to the
withdrawal of life-preserving treatment at the patient’s request.30  He
also rejected the argument that the distinction between assisting suicide
and accepted medical treatment was even more attenuated in the case
of palliative treatment which was known to hasten death.  He observed:
26. The inviolability of life is distinct from, though not unrelated to, the prohibi-
tion on intentional interference with a person’s bodily integrity, a prohibition some
describe as protecting bodily ‘inviolability’.
27. House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, H.L. Paper
No. 21-I, para. 237 (1994).
28. Here and throughout, “side-effect” denotes an effect that is not intended,
whether as end or as means.  Moreover, an effect’s being intended rather than a side-
effect (or vice versa) has nothing to do with whether it can be foreseen as certain: walking
in shoes is foreseen as certain to wear down their soles but—save where someone has
some purpose of wearing them down, such as to win an unusual bet—is not intended to
do so, and so is a mere side-effect.  For the same reason, what in some or many cases is a
side-effect may be not a side-effect; that is, when the acting person intends the effect, he
or she chooses it as a means or perhaps as an end (that is, for its own sake).
29. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att’y General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
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6 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
[T]he distinction drawn here is one based upon intention – in the
case of palliative care the intention is to ease pain, which has the
effect of hastening death, while in the case of assisted suicide, the
intention is undeniably to cause death.31
He added:
In my view, distinctions based on intent are important, and in fact
form the basis of our criminal law. While factually the distinction
may, at times, be difficult to draw, legally it is clear.32
  Echoing Justice Sopinka, the Supreme Court of the United States has
affirmed the distinction between trying to hasten death and merely
foreseeing the hastening of death.  In Vacco v. Quill,33 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, delivering the judgment of the Court, noted that the distinc-
tion between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment
is a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profes-
sion and in law and is important, logical, and rational.34  The distinc-
tion, he added, comports with fundamental legal principles of
causation and intent.  When a patient dies after refusing treatment, he
dies from an underlying fatal disease, but if a patient ingests lethal med-
ication, he is killed by that medication.35  Moreover, a physician who
withdraws life-sustaining treatment “purposefully intends, or may so
intend, only to respect his patient’s wishes” and to cease doing futile
things to the patient.36  The same is true when a doctor administers
palliative drugs: even if the drugs hasten death “the physician’s purpose
and intent is, or maybe, only to ease his patient’s pain,” unlike the phy-
sician whose purpose is to assist suicide.37  The law, he continued, had
long used the actor’s intent to distinguish between two acts with the
same result. The law distinguishes actions taken “because of” a given
end from actions taken “in spite of” their unintended but foreseen
consequences.38
Similarly, the Law Lords have distinguished between an intention
to kill, on the one hand, and foresight of death, even as a virtual cer-
tainty, on the other.  They have held that, while foresight may be evi-
dence from which intention may be inferred, it is not equivalent to
intention.39  In Hancock and Shankland, Lord Scarman noted that in
31. Id. at 607.
32. Id. See also id. at 586 (referring to suicide as involving a “choice of death over
life.”).
33. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
34. Id. at 800–01.
35. Id. at 801.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 802.
38. Id. at 802–03.
39. See R. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 (H.L.) (Eng.); R. v. Hancock & Shankland
[1986] A.C. 455 (H.L.) (Eng.); R. v. Woollin [1999] 1 A.C. 82 (H.L.) (Eng.).  Although
some sentences in Woollin could have been clearer, the case does uphold the distinction
between intention and foresight.  As the Court of Appeal has subsequently confirmed, it
is clear from Woollin read as a whole that it affirms the distinction between intention and
foresight, and that it is a misdirection for a judge to tell a jury that foresight of the virtual
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2014] A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA? 7
Moloney the House of Lords had made it “absolutely clear that foresight
of consequences is no more than evidence of the existence of intent.”40
His Lordship stated that foresight must be considered, and its weight
assessed, together with all the evidence in the case, adding:
Foresight does not necessarily imply the existence of intention,
though it may be a fact from which when considered with all the
other evidence a jury may think it right to infer the necessary
intent.41
  In Bland, Lord Goff observed that it was lawful for a doctor to adminis-
ter drugs to ease pain even if the doctor foresaw that they would have
the effect of hastening death.  His Lordship referred to:
the established rule that a doctor may, when caring for a patient
who is, for example, dying of cancer, lawfully administer pain-kill-
ing drugs despite the fact that he knows that an incidental effect
of that application will be to abbreviate the patient’s life.42
Lord Goff was echoed by Lord Steyn in Pretty:
Under the double effect principle medical treatment may be
administered to a terminally ill person to alleviate pain although it
may hasten death: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789,
867D, per Lord Goff of Chieveley.  This principle entails a distinc-
tion between foreseeing an outcome and intending it . . . .43
  The distinction between intending and foreseeing death is also
endorsed by the Dutch, the pioneers of legalized euthanasia.  In the
Netherlands, “euthanasia” requires an intention to kill, not merely fore-
sight of death.44
In light of the endorsement of the distinction between intention
and foresight by the highest authorities in Canada, the United States,
and England, it is surprising that Justice Smith should have conflated
EWCA (Crim) 192, [2003] 2 Criminal Appeal Reports 30, at [43]-[44]. Cf. Re A [2001]
Fam 147, discussed in KEOWN, supra note 22, at 11.
40. Hancock, [1986] A.C. at 471.
41. Id. at 472.
42. Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, 867 (H.L.) (Eng.).
43. R. (Pretty) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2001] U.K.H.L. 61, para. 55 [2002] 1
A.C. 800 (Eng.).  The ethical principle or idea of “double effect” holds that an effect that
is intended is subject to moral and legal rules that do or may well differ from the rules
applicable to a side-effect, so that an effect of a kind that is morally and/or legally culpa-
ble when caused as an intended effect is or may be morally acceptable when caused as a
foreseen side-effect.  (It is not sufficient that a bad effect is merely foreseen: there must
also be a sufficiently serious reason to justify conduct which foreseeably brings about a
bad consequence.)  The principle or idea was also defended by the House of Lords Select
Committee on Medical Ethics, which examined the case for legalizing voluntary euthana-
sia.  House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, H.L. Paper No.
21-I, para. 242–44 (1994).  Defending the principle or idea in debate in the House of
Lords, Lord Williams of Mostyn Q.C., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the
Home Office (and later Attorney General), rejected the argument that double effect was
sophistry and that the law was difficult or obscure.  The law was, he said, “perfectly plain.”
583 PARL. DEB., H.L., (5th ser.) (1997) 743–44 (UK).  For a brief introduction to double
effect, see ALFONSO GÓMEZ-LOBO, MORALITY AND THE HUMAN GOODS 54–56, 79–80 (2012).
44. P.J. VAN DER MAAS ET AL., EUTHANASIA AND OTHER MEDICAL DECISIONS CONCERN-
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8 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
intention and foresight.45  No less surprisingly, counsel for the Attorney
General of Canada did little to help the judge from falling into this
error.  Remarkably, counsel submitted46 that the criminal law does not
appear to recognize the distinction between intention and foresight.  If,
however, the criminal law draws no distinction between administering
drugs to palliate pain, foreseeing they will as a side-effect shorten life, and
administering a lethal drug in order to kill the patient, how can the for-
mer be lawful and the latter unlawful?
Justice Smith sought to explain away the affirmation in Rodriguez of
the distinction between intended and foreseen consequences on the
ground47 that Rodriguez was not a criminal case.  However, although
Rodriguez was concerned with Charter issues, it considered them in rela-
tion to the crime of assisting suicide.  Justice Smith added48 that Justice
Sopinka, delivering the majority judgment in Rodriguez, had acknowl-
edged the difficulty of drawing a bright-line factual distinction, and that
Rodriguez was clearly focused on a legal, rather than a factual or ethical,
distinction.49  However, the evidential problems which may exist in
determining a defendant’s intention have scant bearing on the reality
and importance of the conceptual and psychologically—that is, humanly—
factual and real distinction, a distinction which explains why administer-
ing morphine with intent to ease pain, merely foreseeing the shorten-
ing of life, is lawful and endorsed by professional medical ethics,
whereas administering morphine with intent to shorten life is murder
and rejected by professional medical ethics.50
Moreover, this key legal distinction tracks the ethical distinction
between trying to bring about a bad consequence and merely foreseeing
that one’s conduct will do so.  Between, for example, administering
chemotherapy merely foreseeing it will cause the patient to suffer nausea
and hair loss, and administering chemotherapy with intent to cause the
patient to suffer nausea and hair loss.51
45. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, para. 328 (Can. B.C.).
46. Id. at para. 327.
47. Id. at para. 328.
48. Id. at para. 329.
49. Id. at para. 330.
50. The evidence of palliative care experts is that palliative drugs, properly titrated,
do not in fact shorten life. See, e.g., S.A. Fohr, The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Separat-
ing Myth from Reality, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 315 (1998).
51. See supra note 43.  Further, the importance of intention is evident in Justice
Smith’s own definitions of “assisted suicide,” “euthanasia,” “palliative care,” and “palliative
sedation” set out early in the judgment. See Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. at para. 37–38; para.
41–42.  For example, Justice Smith uses “euthanasia” to mean “the intentional termina-
tion of the life of a patient by a physician, or someone acting under the direction of a
physician, at the patient’s request, for compassionate reasons.” Id. at para. 38.  She also
states that, since Rodriguez, “[I]t has been clear that potentially life-shortening symptom
relief is permissible where the physician’s intention is to ease pain.” and cites the passage
from Justice Sopinka’s judgment in that case where he notes that distinctions based on
intention are important and form the basis of the criminal law. Id. at para. 225; see supra
note 32.  She also states that “the law in Canada” lets physicians legally administer medica-
tions even though they know that the doses of medication in question may hasten death,
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2014] A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA? 9
Oddly, Justice Smith omitted to disclose the authority she relied
upon to reject the clear distinction made by the Supreme Court in Rod-
riguez between intending and merely foreseeing death.  It appears to
have been a later decision of the Supreme Court: R. v. Chartrand.52
The defendant in that case was charged with abducting a person under
the age of fourteen contrary to section 281 of the Criminal Code.  The
section provides that anyone not being a parent, guardian, or person
having the lawful care or charge of a child who unlawfully takes the
child “with intent to deprive” such a person of the possession of the
child is guilty of an offense.  The defendant took a child from a school-
yard, although the child’s companions protested, without telling the
companions where he was taking the child.  He took the child three
kilometers from the schoolyard in a car and took photographs of the
child.  The child’s father did not know of the child’s whereabouts for
up to ninety minutes.  The trial judge directed an acquittal.53  An
appeal to the Court of Appeal of Ontario was dismissed on the ground
that there was no evidence on which a jury, properly instructed, could
find that there was an intent to deprive the parents of possession of
their child.54  A further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was
allowed and a new trial ordered.
Before examining the Supreme Court’s judgment, we should
notice that the offense of abduction contrary to Section 28155 has much
the same logic as ordinary cases of theft contrary to Section 322(1) of
the Code: taking a thing “with intent to deprive, temporarily or abso-
lutely, the owner of it . . . .”56  As reflection on the ordinary case of theft
easily shows, the thief’s intent to get the thing, temporarily or not, just is
the intent to deprive the owner of it, and the fact that some thieves do
not think of the owner’s loss but only of their own gain does not mean
that the owner’s loss is a mere consequence and side-effect; rather, even
in such a case, it is one and the same intent looked at from different
angles. The thief’s gain is the owner’s loss; intention of one is intention
of the other; the thief cannot get his gain save by means of depriving
the owner.  Similarly, the abductor cannot achieve his unlawful control
over the child save by means of depriving the parents of such control
and possession.
The judgments of the Ontario courts were misguided, confused by
a merely sophistical labeling of an intended consequence as a merely
foreseen consequence.  This sort of case is far removed indeed from
administering analgesics with one or other of two different intentions:
52. R. v. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864 (Can.).  This was the authority cited to the
author by counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, Ms. Donnaree Nygard, in an email
dated 12 February 2014, in response to an email of 10 February asking what authority
counsel had in mind when submitting that Canadian criminal law equated the foreseen
hastening of death with the purposeful hastening of death.  I am grateful to Ms. Nygard
for confirming my suspicion that this was the relevant authority.  Emails on file with the
author.
53. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 870-73.
54. Id. at 873-74.
55. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 281 (Can.).
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to shorten life, or to ease pain.  The doctor’s calculation of how much
analgesic to administer follows a different route, depending on his or
her purpose, even in the rare case when the result of the calculation
coincides.  No such difference exists in the thief’s or the abductor’s
“calculations,” in which his gain and the owner’s or parents’ loss are in
lockstep, even if he averts his attention from the loss.  The Supreme
Court of Canada thus reached the indubitably right result, but did so in
a rather clumsy way, failing to identify clearly the sophistry and inappro-
priateness of the Ontario courts’ distinction between intention and
consequences, a distinction which would make nonsense of plain theft
in those cases where the wrongdoer is resolutely diverting his own atten-
tion from the loss that his gain (the focus of his attention) entails and
imposes on the owner, not as a side-effect of the gain but as part of what
the thief intends and needs as a means. To repeat: this is quite different
from the situation where the doctor who intends only pain relief needs
to administer analgesics in a quantity that has the side-effect of hasten-
ing death.  The hastening of death in such a case is not needed for pain
relief, and in and of itself does not promote that relief. But the owner’s
loss is needed for the thief’s gain, and does promote it—owner and
thief cannot simultaneously enjoy the rights to exclusive possession.
Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé stated that the issue was whether the intent required by Section
281 should, as the Crown submitted, be broad in order to promote the
section’s purpose of protecting children, or instead restrictive, as the
respondent submitted.57  The judge stated that general principles of
mens rea applied to “with intent to” and it was “sufficient that the taker
knows or foresees that his or her actions would be certain or substan-
tially certain” to result in the parents or guardians being deprived of the
ability to exercise control over the child.  She cited a passage from the
judgment of Justice Martin in R. v. Buzzanga, a case on the “wilful” pro-
motion of hatred.58  The passage reads (with emphases supplied by Jus-
tice L’Heureux-Dubé):
I agree . . . that, as a general rule, a person who foresees that a conse-
quence is certain or substantially certain to result from an act which he
does in order to achieve some other purpose, intends that consequence.
The actor’s foresight of the certainty or moral certainty of the con-
sequence resulting from his conduct compels a conclusion that if
he, none the less, acted so as to produce it, then he decided to
bring it about (albeit regretfully), in order to achieve his ultimate
purpose. His intention encompasses the means as well as to his ultimate
objective.59
57. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 869. It was clear that “possession” was not limited
to circumstances in which the parent or guardian was actually in physical control of the
child at the time of the taking. Id. at 888.
58. R. v. Buzzanga & Durocher [1979] 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369, 384-85.  (Ont. Can.).
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Justice L’Heureux-Dubé continued60 that this definition of intent
was subsequently approved by the Canadian Supreme Court in Keeg-
stra,61 and that in Olan62 the same court “examined the possibility” that
“intent” under Section 338 (now Section 38063) of the Criminal Code
may encompass a contemplated outcome distinct from the purpose of
the conduct and adopted the dictum of the English Court of Appeal in
Allsop:
Generally, the primary objective of fraudsmen is to advantage
themselves.  The detriment that results to their victims is secon-
dary to that purpose and incidental.  It is ‘intended’ only in the
sense that it is a contemplated outcome of the fraud that is
perpetrated.
This dictum is rather artless for, as the discussion above of theft and
abduction shows, the fraudster’s gain is the victim’s loss, and the intent
to gain involves the intent to impose loss, even if the fraudster/thief/
abductor contrives not to attend to the full content of his intention.  In
any event, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé went on (having noted64 that “inno-
cent motive or purpose,” while relevant, is not dispositive of the ques-
tion of intent) to quote (again supplying the emphases) Don Stuart’s
Canadian Criminal Law:65
The Code provides no general definition of intent and our courts
have not found it necessary to fill the gap. ‘Intent’ seems to have been
construed in a loose colloquial sense of actual desire, end, purpose, aim,
objective or design and knowledge to mean actual knowledge, for example,
of the contents of the package possessed. It seems futile for criminal law
to enter the unfathomable depths of the philosophical debate as
to the meaning of ‘intent’. Our courts are, as we shall soon explore,
increasingly prepared to extend mens rea to wider concepts of states of
mind. This being so, the debate as to the meaning of intent will
often be totally irrelevant.66
  The difficulties of defining and proving intent had, added Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé, been examined by the Canadian Government in its
white paper on amendment of the Criminal Code.  The white paper,
like Professor Glanville Williams, proposed that intention should
include not only purpose but, more broadly, awareness that a conse-
quence will occur,67 though she also noted authorities, such as Steane,68
60. Id.
61. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 774-75 (Can.).
62. R. v. Olan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175 (Can.).
63. Section 380(1) provides: “Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudu-
lent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds
the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable
security or any service” is guilty of an indictable offence.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46, § 380(1) (Can.).
64. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 891.
65. DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 128–30 (2d ed., 1987).
66. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 891–92.  It is, of course, one thing for courts to
extend the mens rea of a crime by including recklessness; quite another to do so by artifi-
cially and problematically stretching the ordinary meaning of ‘intention.’
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going the other way.69  She concluded that the element of intent in
Section 281 must be interpreted in the broader way so as to give the
section a meaning consistent with its legislative intent and the social
context.70  It would be “rare indeed” that that deprivation of possession
of a child from the parents or guardians was not the intent of the
impugned act, but if the purpose of the section were to be achieved,
foresight of the certainty or near certainty of the end result must be
sufficient.71
If Chartrand was thought by Justice Smith to be an authority for
rejecting the distinction between intending and foreseeing death
affirmed in Rodriguez, her Ladyship was surely mistaken.  Justice
Sopinka carefully considered and answered the precise question whether a
doctor who merely foresaw the hastening of death therefore intended
it, and his consideration of the argument to the contrary was, moreover,
careful and thorough. Chartrand was, by contrast, concerned with the
statutory meaning of “intent” in relation to an entirely different
offence—the meaning to be attributed to the use of the term in a con-
text where it could (in the court’s view) be equated or elided with far
wider concepts such as “wilfully” or even “with a guilty mind,” and
where (on a better analysis) the distinction between intention and con-
sequences is uniquely artificial, indeed sophistical.
Moreover, the reasoning in Chartrand is unsatisfactory in several
further respects.  First, it relies heavily and uncritically on the passage
lifted from the judgment of Justice Martin in Buzzanga.  We should
begin by noting that, like Chartrand itself, Buzzanga was not concerned
with the law of homicide. Buzzanga was not even concerned with a
crime whose mens rea was formulated in terms of “intent.”  It concerned
the crime of “wilfully” promoting hatred against an identifiable group
contrary to Section 281.2(2) of the Criminal Code.72  It does not follow
that “wilfully” in a statute means the same as “intentionally.”  Moreover,
in common idiom “intentionally” is often used more broadly than “with
intent” so as to mean “not unintentionally,” that is, not by mistake or
accident.73  Such linguistic looseness, which is obviously even greater in
relation to “wilfully” or “with mens rea,” does not undermine the distinct
reality of intention as, precisely, seeking to achieve, either as an end or
as a means.  Further, the crime of murder in Canadian law clearly
requires proof of intention.74
As for the passage from the judgment of Justice Martin quoted by
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,75 it begins with two qualifications, one of
68. R. v. Steane [1947] K.B. 997.
69. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 894.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 894-95.
72. R. v. Buzzanga & Durocher, [1979] 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369.
73. See JOHN FINNIS, INTENTION AND IDENTITY: COLLECTED ESSAYS VOLUME II 184
(2011).
74. Section 229(a)(1) of the Code provides that it is murder to cause the death of
another human being and to “mean to” cause death, a clear requirement of purpose.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 229(a)(1) (Can.).
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which is excised by an ellipsis inserted by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé.  The
excised—and not insignificant—qualification reads:
(assuming without deciding that there may be cases in which
intended consequences are confined to those which it is the
actor’s conscious purpose to bring about).76
The second qualification limits the equation of foresight with intention
to “a general rule.”  Therefore, Justice Martin was not purporting to
equiparate foresight of certainty with intention in all cases.  Moreover,
the passage is hardly a model of clarity.  It confuses ends, means and
foreseen consequences.  It speaks of acting “in order to achieve some
other purpose;” acting “so as to produce it,” and concludes (in a sen-
tence emphasized by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé) that an agent’s intention
“encompasses the means as well as to his ultimate objective.”77  The
passage is correct that one intends not only one’s end but also the
means one chooses to bring about that end.  But this is hardly sound
authority for—indeed, it tells against—the proposition that one also
intends those foreseen consequences which one’s end or means may or
will produce as side-effects—“side-effects” precisely because neither
ends nor means to ends, and thus not intended.  The passage thus dis-
closes serious confusion and is weak authority for conflating intention
with foresight, either in general or in relation to murder.
Further, Justice Martin, in the pages of his judgment leading up to
the quoted passage, recognized that the meaning of intention had been
the subject of academic and judicial disagreement, and that there was
authority that it was limited to “purpose.”78  Before embracing a defini-
tion extending to foresight of certainty, he cited authorities including
Glanville Williams, and the decision of the House of Lords in Hyam79
that foresight of death as highly probable was equivalent to an intention
to kill.80  Justice Martin then enunciated the passage that was quoted by
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé.81
The judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé fails to recognize not
only the confusion in that passage but also the outdated nature of the
discussion of intention which precedes it.  The English law of murder
has come a long way since Hyam, and has (as we noted above82)
rejected the conflation of foresight and intention.  Glanville Williams’
notion of “oblique” intent has, then, been judicially rejected.  Lord
Goff also extrajudicially rejected it in his signal paper on the mental
element in the law of murder.83  Nor has it escaped heavyweight aca-
demic criticism.84
76. Id. at 384.
77. R. v. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864, 890  (Can).
78. Buzzanga, [1979] 49 C.C.C. (2d) at 383.
79. Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] A.C. 55.
80. Buzzanga, [1979] 49 C.C.C. (2d) at 383–84.
81. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 890.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
83. Lord Goff, The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder, 104 L. Q. REV. 30 (1988).
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Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also noted85 that the definition of intent
in Buzzanga was approved in R. v. Keegstra.  But, if Chartrand was mis-
taken in approving that definition, so too was Keegstra.  Moreover, Keeg-
stra was, like Buzzanga, a case concerning the crime of “wilfully”
promoting hatred against an identifiable group, and the Supreme
Court in Keegstra explicitly noted that in Buzzanga, Justice Martin had
observed that “wilfully” has no fixed meaning in the criminal law.86
Keegstra was, moreover, decided before Rodriguez.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé observed further87 that the Supreme
Court in R. v. Olan “examined the possibility that intent under s.338
(now s.380) of the Code may encompass a contemplated outcome dis-
tinct from the purpose of the conduct,” and that it approved the dictum
of the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Allsop.88  However, Olan, like
Keegstra, preceded Rodriguez.  Moreover, it is one thing for a court, as in
Olan, to “examine the possibility” that in the law of fraud intention may
include foresight (though we should note that the word “intent”
appears neither in Section 338(1) nor Section 380(1) as it now is).89  It
is quite another for a court to decide, as in Rodriguez, that in the law of
murder it does not.  Further, it is far from clear that Allsop undermines
the distinction drawn between intention and foresight drawn in
Rodriguez.
Allsop concerned the mens rea for the crime of conspiracy to
defraud.  Allsop, a “sub-broker” for a hire-purchase company, was con-
victed of that crime for dishonestly making false statements on applica-
tions for the hire-purchase of cars so as to induce the company to
accept applications they might otherwise have rejected.  He appealed
on the ground that the trial judge had failed to direct that it was neces-
sary for the Crown to prove an intention to cause economic loss to the
company.  Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held:
Where a person intends by deceit to induce a course of conduct in
another which puts that other’s economic interests in jeopardy he
is guilty of fraud even though he does not intend or desire that
85. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 890.
86. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).  Chief Justice Dickson, delivering the
judgment of the court, wrote that the interpretation of “wilfully” as requiring that the
promotion of racial hatred be intended or foreseen as substantially certain significantly
restricted the reach of the offence. Id. at 774.  He added that the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada favored a narrow reach on the ground that “removing an intent or pur-
pose requirement” could well result in successful prosecutions of cases similar to
Buzzanga, where members of a minority group publish hate propaganda against their own
group in order to create controversy or to agitate for reform: the Commission did not
think that the crime should be used to prosecute such individuals.  Chief Justice Dickson
continued that he endorsed the Commission’s view. Id.  However, artificially stretching
‘intention’ to include ‘foresight of substantial certainty’ extends the reach of the crime and
is liable to catch those whose purpose is solely to create controversy or agitate for reform
but not to promote hatred either as an end or a means.
87. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 890.
88. R. v. Allsop, (1976) 64 Cr. App. R. 29 (Eng.). See supra text accompanying notes
62–64.
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actual loss should ultimately be suffered by that other in this
context.90
Allsop is a case on the scope of the mens rea of the crime of conspiracy to
defraud, and holds that the mens rea is satisfied by an intention to
induce another to put his or her economic interests in jeopardy, even if
there is no further intention to cause economic loss to the victim.  The
crime is not, then, limited to the typical case—discussed above in tan-
dem with typical theft and abduction—which involves an intention to
cause economic loss to the victim as a means of enriching the
fraudsman.91  But it does not follow that the dictum from Allsop quoted
in Chartrand is sound authority for equating foresight with intention.
First, the dictum states that the loss to victims of fraud “is ‘intended’ only
in the sense that it is a contemplated outcome of the fraud.”  This, not
least because of the quotation marks surrounding “intention,” can
equally be read as supporting a distinction between foresight (“contem-
plation”) and intention.  Second, the dictum fails to realize that, gener-
ally, fraudsmen very much intend the detriment to their victims,
precisely as a means of enriching themselves, even if they only advert
consciously to the more seductive and vivid aspect of their intent: their
own gain.  Third, while the Court of Appeal in Allsop did go on to adopt
the view expressed by Lord Diplock in Hyam that no distinction was to
be drawn between the state of mind of one who does an act because he
“desires” to produce an evil consequence and one who does an act
“knowing full well that it is likely to produce that consequence,”92 Hyam
is old and bad law.
Chartrand provides, then, anything but a clear and coherent analy-
sis of intention, ends, means and foresight, and is frail authority indeed
for conflating intention and foresight.93  It does not even mention Rod-
riguez, let alone purport to overrule it.94  Moreover, Chartrand was
decided only the year after Rodriguez and the same nine judges sat in
90. Allsop, (1976) 64 Cr. App. R. at 32.
91. Even if Allsop was not such a case.  The judgment states that it was common
ground that the company did in fact suffer loss because it paid too much for part-
exchanged cars, which were worth less than their pretended value, and because deposits
which had been represented as having been paid had not in fact been paid. Id. at 32.
92. Id.
93. It is also puzzling that the judgment concludes in relation to section 281 that,
“[I]f the purpose of the section is to be achieved, foresight of the certainty or near cer-
tainty of the end result must be sufficient.” R. v. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864, 895.  It is
not easy to imagine a case in which someone foresees that they are depriving a parent or
guardian of a child without intending to do so.  The quotation also raises questions about
the meaning of “near certainty,” and why “near certainty” should suffice for liability but
not “high probability.”  Finally, is it remotely just that the law should regard a surgeon
who, as a last resort, performs an extremely risky operation to try to save the life of a dying
child, and who foresees that death from the operation is a “near certainty,” as having not
only an unlawful state of mind, but the same mens rea, the same murderous intent, as a
man who deliberately strangles the child to death?
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both.95  Are we to believe that the Supreme Court overruled itself with-
out adverting to the fact?
There is, in sum, nothing in Carter to support the judge’s departure
from the clear ruling of the Supreme Court in Rodriguez, a case exactly
on point, that foreseeing the hastening of death is not equivalent to
intending the hastening of death.
Not only did Justice Smith misunderstand the inviolability of life by
conflating foresight with intention, she also appeared to conflate the
inviolability of life with vitalism—that is, with a doctrine calling for the
preservation of human life at all costs.  She claimed96 that the differ-
ence of ethical opinion about euthanasia “is about whether the preser-
vation of human life is an absolute value, subject to no exceptions.”  But
the principle of the inviolability of life does not require the preserva-
tion of human life “subject to no exceptions”; it is a principle excep-
tionlessly excluding certain kinds of choice (those intended as life
shortening), not a principle that of itself requires the choice of life-
preserving measures.97  The judgment also referred to98 the absence of
a societal consensus “that life must always be preserved at all costs.”
This, again, suggests that the judge confused the inviolability of life with
“vitalism,” despite the judgment’s acknowledgment99 that this distinc-
tion had been drawn to the court’s attention.  Society’s rejection of
measures intended to shorten life, its upholding of the inviolability
principle and its maintenance of the law against assisting suicide are
completely compatible with acceptance that measures needed to pre-
serve life can lawfully and ethically be omitted because they are dispro-
portionately burdensome in any of a number of ways.
Rather than recounting the opinions of witnesses critical of the
inviolability of life, the judgment should have demonstrated a sound
understanding of that principle together with a recognition of its foun-
dational importance to the criminal law in Canada and beyond. The
principle remains of foundational legal importance, regardless of the
extent to which it met with the approval of particular ethicists who gave
evidence in the case.100
Finally, the judgment of Justice Smith concluded, strangely, that
the prohibition on euthanasia breached the right to life of one of the
plaintiffs because she might kill herself before she became too disabled
to do so without assistance.101  How the right to life—the right not to
95. Chief Justice Lamer and Justices La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka,
Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, and Major.
96. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, para. 350 (Can. B.C.).
97. Nor is self-defence an “exception” to the principle. Id. at para. 315a.  The prin-
ciple has long been understood to prohibit the intentional killing of the innocent, not
those engaged in unjust aggression; hence the legal justification of reasonable force, even
if lethal, in self-defense.
98. Id. at para. 355.
99. Id. at para. 171.
100. Id. at para. 335, 352.
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be intentionally killed—can be thought to be breached by legislation
prohibiting intentional killing or assistance in self-killing is puzzling.102
II. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE DISABLED?
The second major criticism of Carter, which overlaps with the first,
is that the judgment failed to recognize clearly (if at all) that not only
are euthanasia and assisting suicide inconsistent with the inviolability
principle, but that so, too, is suicide itself, which explains why the law
has consistently discouraged suicide.  This failure in the judgment
paved the way for its mistaken holding103 that the law against assisting
suicide discriminates against those physically unable to commit suicide.
As the judgment recognized,104 the common law considered sui-
cide to be a form of homicide.  The judgment noted105 that in 1972
attempted suicide was decriminalized in Canada, and it quoted106 the
then Minister of Justice who explained that this was done “on the phi-
losophy that this is not a matter which requires a legal remedy, that it
has its roots and its solutions in sciences outside of the law and that
certainly deterrent [sic] under the legal system is unnecessary.”  But the
judgment nowhere appears clearly to recognize that decriminalization
did not amount to an endorsement of suicide, let alone create a right to
suicide.107  Indeed, it quoted the following opinion tendered by an
expert ethicist called by the plaintiffs, Professor Wayne Sumner: “The
role of the physician [in physician-assisted suicide] is limited to provid-
ing the means for the patient to do something which is itself ethically
permissible . . . .  The ethical burden of justifying assistance with suicide
is discharged by justifying suicide itself.”108  However, neither the law
nor professional medical ethics has regarded suicide as ethical, which is
one reason why it remains illegal and, in the view of the medical profes-
sion as a whole, unethical to assist suicide regardless of how autono-
mous and informed the decision to commit suicide may be.109  The
judge’s apparent agreement with Sumner that there is no ethical dis-
tinction between suicide and assisting suicide110 is accurate, but not
because both are ethical: it is accurate because both are unethical.  Sig-
nificantly, the World Medical Association has been consistently opposed
102. And if this plaintiff is able to invoke the right to life against the law prohibiting
assisting suicide, could another plaintiff invoke it against a law prohibiting assisting
female genital mutilation, on the ground that she would rather kill herself than not be
able to obtain assistance to mutilate her genitalia?
103. Id. at para. 15.
104. Id. at para. 102.
105. Id. at para. 105.
106. Id.
107. Though it does appear to appreciate that the majority in Rodriguez did not
interpret decriminalization as an endorsement of suicide. Id. at para. 926.
108. Id. at para. 237.
109. Again failing accurately to articulate the inviolability of life, the judgment sum-
marized the ethical case against euthanasia as involving the contention “[w]hether or not
suicide may be ethical.” Id. at 314(d).  The inviolability of life holds suicide to be seri-
ously unethical.
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to assisting suicide and to euthanasia.  Its “Statement on Physician-
Assisted Suicide” reads:
Physician[s]-assisted suicide, like euthanasia, is unethical and
must be condemned by the medical profession. Where the assis-
tance of the physician is intentionally and deliberately directed at
enabling an individual to end his or her own life, the physician
acts unethically. However the right to decline medical treatment is
a basic right of the patient and the physician does not act unethi-
cally even if respecting such a wish results in the death of the
patient.111
In Rodriguez, Justice Sopinka observed:
[T]he decriminalization of attempted suicide cannot be said to
represent a consensus by Parliament or by Canadians in general
that the autonomy interest of those wishing to kill themselves is
paramount to the state interest in protecting the life of its citizens.
Rather, the matter of suicide was seen to have its roots and its
solutions in sciences outside the law, and for that reason not to
mandate a legal remedy.112
  It was a similar story in England, where suicide was decriminalized by
the Suicide Act 1961.  Responding to concerns (concerns which subse-
quent misunderstanding has shown to be well-founded) that
decriminalization might be interpreted as a condonation of suicide, the
responsible government minister made it clear that it should not be
thought that because the government was changing the method of
treatment for the suicidal it was seeking to depreciate the gravity of
attempted suicide, and stressed that it should not be thought that “self
murder” was regarded at all lightly by the government.113  The mainte-
nance of the prohibition on assisting or encouraging suicide, punisha-
ble by up to fourteen years’ imprisonment, provides further evidence
that decriminalization was not intended to condone suicide, let alone
create a right to suicide.  After suicide was decriminalized, it ceased to
be criminal, but remained unlawful.  (The fact that conduct is not, or is
no longer, criminal does not mean it is not contrary to law.)  Hence the
serious crime of assisting or encouraging suicide.  And, in English law at
any rate, it remains criminal to incite another to assist one to commit
suicide.  Justice Smith stated that, “it is clear that requesting assistance
in death does not in and of itself contravene any law.”114  Even if that is
111. WMA Resolution on Euthanasia, WORLD MED. ASS’N (Oct. 2002, reaffirmed with
minor revision in 2013) http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/e13b/.
Moreover, the Carter judgment’s summary of the ethical debate states that intentionally
ending the life of a patient is either ethically inconceivable for physicians “or conceivable
only in stringently defined exceptional circumstances.” Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. at para.
310.  Does this accurately reflect the continuing condemnation of euthanasia in any cir-
cumstances by professional bodies such as the WMA?
112. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att’y General), [1993] S.C.R. 519 at 597–98
(Can.).
113. 644 PARL. DEB., H.C., (4th ser.) (1960–61) 1425–26 (U.K.); 645 PARL. DEB.,
H.C., (4th ser.) (1960-61) 822–23 (U.K.).
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an accurate statement of Canadian criminal law (and the judgment
cites no authority to support it), the continuing prohibition of assisting
suicide in Canadian law, as in English law, provides clear evidence of
the law’s disapproval of suicide.
In R. (Pretty) v. Director of Public Prosecutions,115 the House of Lords
rejected the appellant’s argument that the law against assisting suicide
discriminated against those who, like the appellant, were physically una-
ble to commit suicide.  Lord Bingham pointed out that such an argu-
ment rested on a misconception, for the law conferred no right to
suicide.  Suicide was decriminalized because the prohibition was not
thought to act as a deterrent; because it cast an unwarranted stigma on
innocent members of the suicide’s family, and because it led to the dis-
tasteful result of prosecuting attempted suicides.  That the Suicide Act
conferred no right to commit suicide was illustrated by the serious pun-
ishment it provided for assisting suicide.  The criminal law could not,
he added, be regarded as discriminatory because it applied to everyone.
The broad policy of the criminal law was to apply its offence-creating
provisions to everyone.  Provisions criminalizing the misuse of drugs did
not exempt the addict.  Moreover, “mercy killing” was, in law, killing.
His Lordship concluded: “If the criminal law sought to proscribe the
conduct of those who assisted the suicide of the vulnerable, but exoner-
ated those who assisted the suicide of the non-vulnerable, it could not
be administered fairly and in a way which would command respect.”116
Carter appears to equate decriminalization with condonation.  But
this is, as Lord Bingham (and Justice Sopinka before him) indicated, a
false equation.  Imagine that a legislature, wishing to eradicate recrea-
tional heroin use, lifts the criminal prohibition on the recreational pos-
session and use of heroin—on the ground that heroin addicts can be
better helped by medical treatment than by criminal prosecution—but
maintains the prohibition on supplying heroin.  Would this discrimi-
nate against a person too disabled to procure a supply?  Would such a
person be entitled to a judicially-approved fix?  Or imagine a legislature
115. R. (Pretty) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2001] U.K.H.L. 61, [2002] 1 A.C. 800
(Eng.).
116. Id. at para. 35–36.  Similarly, in Fleming v. Ireland, [2013] I.E.S.C. 19 (a case
discussed in Part V, infra) the Supreme Court of Ireland rejected the appellant’s argu-
ment that the law’s prohibition on assisting suicide discriminated against those who were
physically unable to commit suicide without assistance.  Chief Justice Denham, delivering
the judgment of the court, stated that the prohibition applied “equally to everybody,”
adding:
It is difficult to succeed in an equality challenge to a law which applies to every-
one without distinction, and which is based on the fundamental equal value of
each human life.  It is often the case that neutral laws will affect individuals in
different ways: in the absence of impact on a fundamental right that does not
normally give rise to any unconstitutionality.
Id. at para. 133.  Moreover, when the appellant lost the ability to commit suicide, this was
not through operation of any law before which she was required to be held equal, but
through the fact of her condition. Id. at para. 134. The Supreme Court held that the
appellant had no right which could be interfered with by any disability, and that, as there
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which, wishing to eradicate female genital mutilation, but regarding the
women who undergo it as victims of a barbaric practice, decriminalizes
self-mutilation, while maintaining the prohibition on assisting mutila-
tion.  Would this discriminate against a woman too disabled to mutilate
her own genitalia?  Would such a woman be entitled to judicially-
approved mutilation?
Justice Smith asserted that, “The starting point in our law—the
default position—is that persons control their own physical integ-
rity.”117  Persons may indeed control their own physical integrity, but
within limits.  The law recognizes our physical integrity, our lives, and
our autonomy as goods we have the right to safeguard.  It does not fol-
low that we may lawfully consent to the amputation of healthy limbs, to
be killed, or sell ourselves into slavery, conduct which undermines these
goods.  The judgment proceeds that “[a]n example with direct rele-
vance to this case is the evolution of the doctrine of informed consent
to medical treatment.”118  The relevance is not obvious.  The legal
requirement of consent to medical treatment provides a shield against
unwanted touching, not a sword to demand interventions.  It does not
follow from the fact that physicians may not treat patients without their
consent that they can terminate them with their consent.  Moreover, the
killing of patients has never been regarded by the law as a medical treat-
ment but as a serious crime (and by the medical profession as a whole
as inconsistent with the physician’s role as healer).  Reflecting such rea-
soning, Section 14 of the Criminal Code provides, it will be recalled,119
that no person is entitled to have death inflicted upon him.
Finally, if, as Justice Smith held, the law discriminates against those
unable to commit suicide, why did the judgment impose conditions
(such as ‘grievous illness’) on those who need of assistance to kill them-
selves, conditions which do not apply to those who are physically able to
kill themselves?  Why are such conditions not discriminatory?
III. EVADING THE LOGICAL “SLIPPERY SLOPE” ARGUMENT
Justice Smith claimed120 that the purpose of the prohibition on
assisting suicide is protection of the “vulnerable.”  This overlooks the
distinct purpose of affirming the principle of the inviolability of life, of
discouraging anyone, “vulnerable” or not, from committing (to echo
the British government minister quoted above121) “self murder.”  The
crime of assisting suicide is committed irrespective of the vulnerability
of the suicide.
In Rodriguez, Justice Sopinka observed that the purpose of the pro-
hibition was not confined to protection of the vulnerable.  Early in his
judgment he asked: “As members of a society based upon respect for
the intrinsic value of human life and on the inherent dignity of every
117. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. at para. 1149.
118. Id. at para. 1151.
119. See supra text accompanying note 6.
120. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. at para. 16.
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human being, can we incorporate within the Constitution which
embodies our most fundamental values a right to terminate one’s own
life in any circumstances?”122  The sanctity of life had, he added, long
been understood to exclude freedom of choice in the self-infliction of
death.123  He noted that Section 241(b), which was “grounded in the
respect for and the desire to protect human life,”124 fulfilled “the gov-
ernment’s objectives of preserving life and protecting the vulnera-
ble.”125  At one point he did state that the section has as its purpose the
protection of the vulnerable,126 but he continued that this purpose “is
grounded in the state interest in protecting life and reflects the policy
of the state that human life should not be depreciated by allowing life
to be taken.”127
The purpose was not only a policy of the state but was part of
Canada’s “fundamental conception of the sanctity of human life.”128
The Law Reform Commission of Canada had noted, in its working
paper on euthanasia, aiding suicide, and the cessation of treatment,
that “[p]reservation of human life is acknowledged to be a fundamental
value of our society” and that in general the criminal law endorsed the
principle of the sanctity of human life.129  Moreover, while bodies such
as the Commission had great sympathy for those who wanted to end
their lives in order to end significant suffering, they refused to condone
euthanasia and assisting suicide.  Justice Sopinka added: “The basis for
this refusal is twofold it seems—first, the active participation by one
individual in the death of another is intrinsically morally and legally wrong,
and second, there is no certainty that abuses can be prevented by any-
thing less than a complete prohibition.”130  There was no halfway mea-
sure that could be relied upon with assurance to fully achieve the
legislation’s purpose:
[F]irst, because the purpose extends to the protection of the life
of the terminally ill.  Part of this purpose . . . is to discourage the
122. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att’y General), [1993] S.C.R. 519, 585 (Can.).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 613.
125. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).  He concluded that the blanket ban was
grounded on a substantial consensus among western countries, medical organizations,
and the Canadian Law Reform Commission that “in order to effectively protect life and
those who are vulnerable” an exceptionless prohibition was the best approach.  The for-
mulation of safeguards had been unsatisfactory and had failed to allay fears that a relaxa-
tion of the clear standard set by the law “will undermine the protection of life and will
lead to abuses of the exception.” Id. at 613.




130. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).  He also stated that to the extent that there was a
consensus, it was that “human life must be respected” and we must be careful not to
undermine the institutions that protect it.  The consensus was reflected in the prohibition
of capital punishment, a prohibition supported, in part, on the basis that allowing the
state to kill would cheapen human life.  The prohibition on assisting suicide served a
similar purpose, and to permit a physician lawfully to participate in taking life would send
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terminally ill from choosing death over life.  Secondly, even if the
latter consideration can be stripped from the legislative purpose,
we have no assurance that the exception can be made to limit the
taking of life to those who are terminally ill and genuinely desire
death.131
Justice Smith concluded, in relation to the protection of the vul-
nerable, that an alternative means of protecting the vulnerable would
be to keep an “almost absolute” prohibition in place, allowing
“grievously and irremediably ill adult persons who are competent, fully-
informed, non-ambivalent and free from coercion or duress” to receive
a lethal injection or assistance in suicide.132
However, her judgment nowhere answered the cardinal objection,
raised in expert evidence for Canada, that once the principle of the
inviolability of life is abandoned by endorsing voluntary euthanasia in
some circumstances, the bright line grounded in the intrinsic and ine-
liminable dignity of each patient is usurped by an arbitrary line depen-
dent on subjective judgments about which patients would be “better off
dead” and that, in particular, the endorsement of voluntary euthanasia
logically entails the endorsement of non-voluntary euthanasia, that is,
the killing of incompetent patients.  There are three reasons why all
this is so.
First, the criteria for euthanasia set out in the judgment133 are
vague. What, precisely, is meant by a “serious illness, disease or disabil-
ity”, and a “state of advanced weakening capacities”? Would arthritis, or
impaired hearing or sight, qualify? The conditions are also arbitrary.
Why exclude someone who almost meets them (whatever they mean) or
someone who feels that their life is no longer worth living for other
reasons, whether or not health-related? And why reject the plaintiffs’
argument that “psychosocial” suffering should count? And is suffering,
especially “psychological” suffering, which is “intolerable” to the
patient, not an inherently subjective criterion?
Secondly, the judgment accepted that the criminal law draws no
distinction between intentionally bringing about a prohibited conse-
quence and doing something knowing that the prohibited consequence
is virtually certain to result.134  It also agreed with the arguments
advanced by three experts for the plaintiffs—Professors Battin and
Sumner (philosophers) and Dr. Angell (a physician)—that there is no
ethical distinction between “physician-assisted death” and other end of
131. Id. at 614.  Similarly, in Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist, deliv-
ering the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court, listed several state interests justifying the
prohibition on assisting suicide.  First, Washington had an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life.  The interests in the sanctity of life represented by the laws
against homicide were threatened by one willing to participate in taking another’s life.
The interest was symbolic and aspirational as well as practical.  521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
Another interest was the protection of vulnerable groups including the poor, elderly, and
disabled from abuse, neglect and mistakes. Id. at 731-32 .
132. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, para. 16 (Can. B.C.).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11, and note 12.
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life practices, such as palliative treatment, “whose outcome is highly
likely” to be death.135  However, if there is no legal and ethical distinc-
tion between administering a poison like potassium chloride with intent
to end a patient’s life, and administering morphine to ease pain, fore-
seeing it will shorten life as a side-effect, and it is lawful and ethical to
do the latter when a dying patient is incapable of consenting to it
(which it undoubtedly is), why is it not ethical to do the former and why
should it not be lawful to do so if the dying patient is incapable of
requesting it?
Thirdly: there is the formidable logical “slippery slope” argu-
ment.136 This argument runs that even in cases of voluntary euthanasia
it is the doctor who decides whether to grant the patient’s request, and
no responsible doctor would grant the request unless he or she judged
that death would benefit the patient, because the patient’s life was no
longer “worth living.”  Once a doctor is prepared to make such a judg-
ment in the case of patient capable of requesting death, the judgment
can, logically, equally be made in the case of a patient incapable of
requesting death.  If respect for autonomy and beneficence are thought
to justify voluntary euthanasia, why is beneficence alone not thought to
justify non-voluntary euthanasia?  If a doctor thinks death would benefit
the patient, why should the doctor deny the patient that benefit merely
because the patient is incapable of asking for it?  If denying assistance
in suicide to those physically incapable of committing it, and for whom
death is thought a benefit, amounts to discrimination, why does deny-
ing euthanasia to those mentally incapable of requesting it, and for
whom death is thought a benefit, not amount to discrimination?  The
logical “slippery slope” argument is unanswerable.137
135. Id. at para. 335, 1336.
136. Although the focus here is on the logical argument, the empirical “slippery
slope” argument (which the judgment also failed to address adequately) should not be
overlooked.  The empirical argument holds that, given the intractable difficulties of draft-
ing and policing exceptions to the law against medical killing, safeguards cannot be made
effective.  It challenges advocates of relaxation of the law to show that such safeguards can
be made effective, something which (as well shall see in Part IV, infra) defenders of relax-
ation of the law, whether in the Netherlands, Oregon, or elsewhere, have failed to show.
The argument does not require opponents of reform to show that the incidence of eutha-
nasia and physician-assisted suicide has increased wherever the law has been relaxed.
Although such an increase is indeed to be expected (unless we believe that the law against
murder, and professional sanctions, have no deterrent effect) statistical evidence of prac-
tice before legalization may well be non-existent.  For a persuasive argument, based on
the “law of demand,” about the likely increase of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
after their decriminalization, see NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA 132–38 (2006).
137. For an attempt to answer it, see Hallvard Lillehammer, Voluntary Euthanasia
and the Logical Slippery Slope Argument, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 545 (2002).  Lillehammer asserts
that the law could require both beneficence and autonomy.  So it could.  But he omits to
explain why it should so limit the “benefit” of euthanasia.
One possible argument is that the law does sometimes distinguish between consen-
sual and non-consensual conduct, as in relation to sexual intercourse.  The response to
this argument is that, while a rapist could hardly invoke beneficence to justify intercourse
with an incompetent woman, a doctor could well (as doctors do in the Netherlands)
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Tellingly, arguments thought to justify voluntary euthanasia, which
were adduced by the plaintiff’s two lead ethical experts, Professors Bat-
tin and Sumner, and quoted at some length by the judge, offer no
answer to the logical argument.  Indeed, they are obviously vulnerable
to it.  The judgment quotes Sumner as stating:
Treatment cessation, pain management, and terminal sedation can. . .all
be justified when they are the outcome of an informed choice (whether
request or refusal) on the part of a decisionally capable patient, and they
serve the best interest of the patient by preventing or avoiding needless suf-
fering.  This justification holds even when the result of any of these
measures is the hastening of the patient’s death.  Indeed, these
measures may in many circumstances better serve both patient
autonomy and patient well-being by hastening death, if that is the
outcome that the patient seeks and that will help to minimize
suffering.138
He added: “It is obvious that either assisted suicide or voluntary eutha-
nasia can be justified in exactly the same way by reference to exactly the
same values.”139  As for the counter-argument that assisted suicide and
voluntary euthanasia involve an intent to kill, and that other end-of-life
practices need not, the judgment simply reports that Sumner rejects
it.140
Sumner’s argument prompts at least two obvious questions.  First,
if there is no difference between intending death and foreseeing death,
and if treatment cessation is justified in the case of incompetent
patients (a proposition Sumner would surely accept, unless he sub-
scribes to the absurd proposition that life-preserving measures should
never be withheld or withdrawn from incompetent patients), why
should euthanasia be denied to incompetent patients?  Secondly, if he
thinks the best interests of an incompetent patient would be served by
euthanasia, why should the doctor stay his or her hand merely because
the patient is unable to request it?  What if the patient no longer has, in
his words, “a life worth living”?141  It comes as no surprise that, in a
book published the same year Carter was heard, Sumner openly
endorsed non-voluntary euthanasia.142
138. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at 234 (emphasis added by Justice Smith).
139. Id.
140. Id. at para. 235.
141. Id. at para. 351.  He states: “If the goods of further life would outweigh the
evils then it would be better for the person to continue living, and death would therefore
be a harm to him since it would deprive him of this good future.” Id.  Is not the corollary
that if the evils of further life would outweigh the goods then it would be better for the
person not to continue living and that death would not be a harm to him?
A third question: if Sumner agrees that competent patients have a right to refuse life-
saving treatment for any reason, and if he thinks the doctor’s foresight of the patient’s
hastened death is ethically equivalent to intentionally hastening the patient’s death, why
does he not subscribe to a right to demand euthanasia for any reason?
142. See L.W. SUMNER, ASSISTED DEATH: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND LAW (2011).  “In the
case of severely disabled newborns, the best interest standard can therefore lead to the
result that (a) no corrective treatment will be undertaken for the infant’s condition and
(b) euthanasia will instead be administered. In short, it can justify nonvoluntary euthana-
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Similarly, the evidence of Professor Battin provides no answer to
the logical slope argument.  The judgment quotes her as saying that the
core principles in the debate are autonomy and mercy (or “the right to
be free from pain and suffering”).143  It is one thing to argue that, in
the case of an autonomous patient, voluntary euthanasia can be justi-
fied by autonomy and mercy, but why should mercy be denied the non-
autonomous patient?  Her quoted evidence reads that because, in her
view, autonomy and mercy must work in tandem and do not operate
independently:
[I]t cannot be claimed that permitting physician-assisted dying
would require assisting lovesick teenagers who are not suffering
from a serious medical condition to die; likewise it cannot be
claimed that permitting physician-assisted dying on the basis of
the principle of mercy would require involuntary euthanasia for
someone who is in pain but nevertheless desires to stay alive.144
However, the logical slippery slope argument is not that acceptance of
voluntary euthanasia logically involves acceptance of involuntary eutha-
nasia (euthanasia against the wishes of a competent patient).  It is that
acceptance of voluntary euthanasia logically involves acceptance of non-
voluntary euthanasia (euthanasia of the incompetent).  Why should the
incompetent patient who is suffering intolerably be denied a merciful
release?  The judgment does not say.  Moreover, in her published work,
Battin, like Sumner, endorses non-voluntary euthanasia.145
It is worth adding that, contrary to Battin, it can indeed be argued
that, if voluntary euthanasia is to be allowed, it should be available to
the lovesick teenager, or at least to a much wider range of candidates
than those suffering from a serious illness.  It is arbitrary to confine
euthanasia to those whose suffering is caused by illness, let alone illness
of a particular degree.  Battin states that the principle of “mercy” means
that “No one should be . . . forced to suffer, without adequate cause.”146
How, then, can mercy be confined to suffering due to illness, let alone
“grievous” illness?  There are many sources of suffering.  There is, for
example, grief, which was the cause of the mental suffering endorsed as
an acceptable ground for hastened death by the Dutch Supreme Court
in the Chabot case.147  And what of “existential suffering,” being “tired
of life,” which, though hitherto rejected by the Dutch courts as an
acceptable ground, is thought by many in the Netherlands, including
euthanasia offers the best outcome for decisionally incapable persons in the dying pro-
cess.” Id. at 126.
143. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at 239.  The principle of the inviolability of life is,
of course, notably absent from her list.
144. Id. at 241.
145. MARGARET PABST BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON
THE END OF LIFE 120–23 (1994).
146. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 239.
147. Chabot, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994, no 656.  The Supreme Court stated
that the suffering resulted from a “depression in a particular sense without psychotic char-
acteristics in the context of a complicated grieving process.”  Hoge Raad der Neder-
landen [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands],  21 June 1994 (Neth.), Strafkamer, n.
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the Dutch Minister of Health who introduced the Dutch euthanasia leg-
islation,148 to justify a hastened death.  And Dr. Philip Nitschke, one of
the world’s leading advocates of euthanasia, has reportedly supported
its availability to the “troubled teen.”149  At one point,150 Professor Bat-
tin states that euthanasia should only be available to avoid “suffering
that is either intolerable or about to be so.”  But why should mercy be
denied to those who could tolerate their suffering but do not wish to do
so?  The next plaintiff’s expert quoted in the judgment, Dr. Upshur,
states: “I do not believe that assisted suicide and euthanasia should only
be available to those who are diagnosed as terminally ill, but rather should
be available to those for whom life has become not worth living to them.”151
Clearly, once the law abandons the bright line prohibition on any
intentional ending of patients’ lives, it enters a fuzzy world of arbitrary
judgments about whose lives are, or are not, “worth living.”  It is not
surprising that disability groups in general strongly oppose legalization.
A letter from disability groups in the United Kingdom and United
States which opposed a proposal to relax the law stated: “We are like
society’s ‘canaries in the coalmine’ who can often see the dangers of
potentially discriminatory legislation before others, as it impacts on us
even before the deed is done.  We are scared now; we will be terrified if
assisted suicide becomes state-sanctioned.”152
Justice Smith found that there is a strong consensus in Canada that
if it is ever ethical for physicians to engage in euthanasia “it would be
only in limited and exceptional circumstances, where it is clearly consis-
tent with the patient’s wishes and best interests, and in order to relieve
suffering.”153  But the principles underlying the reasoning of the lead-
ing ethicist experts for the plaintiffs, Professors Sumner and Battin,154
would appear to justify euthanasia, both voluntary and non-voluntary,
in a wide range of cases.155
148. Dutch Minister Favors Suicide Pill, CNN.COM (Apr. 14, 2001), www.cnn.com/
2001/world/europe/04/14/netherlands.suicide/index.html.
149. Kathryn Jean Lopez, Euthanasia Sets Sail: An Interview with Philip Nitschke, the
Other “Dr. Death,” NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 5, 2001), http:/old.nationalreview.com/inter-
rogatory/interrogatory060501.shtml.
150. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 240. Cf. id. at para. 239.
151. Id. at para. 242 (emphasis added).
152. Open Letter from Leaders of Disabled People’s Movement in UK and USA, DISABILITY
ARTS ONLINE CRIPPEN BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://www.disabilityartsonline.org.uk/crip-
pen-cartoon-blog?item=446.
153. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 342.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 138–45.
155. In one of her books, Battin asks whether we are witnessing “the first breaking
waves of a sea-change from one perspective on death and dying to another, a far more
autonomist and directive one much as we have seen changes in reproduction?”  Margaret
Pabst Battin, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Safe, Legal, Rare?, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE:
EXPANDING THE DEBATE 63, 71 (Margaret Pabst Battin et al. eds., 1998).  If, she adds, we
are, then the assumption that physician-assisted suicide “would or should be rare” col-
lapses. Id.  Another essay in the same volume (an essay which takes no side in the ethical
debate) suggests that decriminalization will bring about profound changes in the way that
death and dying are viewed and that social and economic considerations will impact indi-
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Remarkably, Justice Smith’s judgment simply evades the logical
“slippery slope” argument.  It states that the argument “requires specu-
lation and arises only tangentially in connection with the issues in this
case.”156  Earlier, the judgment had observed:
The plaintiffs do not argue that physician-assisted death should be
imposed on patients who do not, themselves, request it.  There-
fore, the ethical debate relevant to this case focuses on a limited
class of patients: those who are competent adults (decisionally
capable); fully informed as to their diagnosis, prognosis and all
options for treatment or palliative care; persistently and consist-
ently requesting assistance with death (that is, non-ambivalent);
and not subject to coercion or undue influence.157
But the fact that the plaintiffs’ arguments do not (for the present) seek
to justify non-voluntary euthanasia surely does not relieve the court of
the duty to consider the obvious implications for incompetent patients
(and other vulnerable patients) of those arguments.  The evidence of
the plaintiffs’ own experts indicates the absence of any clear or coher-
ent limits to euthanasia, whether voluntary or non-voluntary, once the
current bright, ethically coherent line offered by the inviolability of life
is abandoned.
Justice Smith, then, dodged the logical “slippery slope” from volun-
tary to non-voluntary euthanasia.  No less remarkably, in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, Chief Justice Finch’s dissent dismissed the
relevance of the incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia.  Responding to
the submission of counsel for Canada that the evidence of non-volun-
tary euthanasia from jurisdictions with relaxed laws indicated the insuf-
ficiency of their safeguards, Chief Justice Finch wrote that as non-
voluntary euthanasia does not involve the consent of the patient it is
“not relevant to considering safeguards for voluntary euthanasia.”158
a frivolous indulgence.”  Patricia S. Mann, Meanings of Death, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUI-
CIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE 11, 23 (Margaret Pabst Battin et al. eds., 1998).
156. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 365.
157. Id. at para. 313.  By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court was alert to the implica-
tions of accepting what was presented as a limited right to physician-assisted suicide.
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that if suicide was a right, it was a right enjoyed by every
man and woman and could not be limited to competent, terminally ill adults, and the
decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision-maker was for legal purposes the decision
of the patient.  Such a right, he observed, “is likely, in effect, a much broader license,
which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain.”  Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 733 (1997).  Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ireland in
Fleming (a case discussed in Part V, infra), Chief Justice Denham noted that the right to
assistance in suicide claimed by the appellant in that case “would sweep very far indeed.”
Fleming v. Ireland, [2013] I.E.S.C. 19 at para. 113.  The Chief Justice added:
In general, the Constitution guarantees rights of general application for the
benefit of every citizen and person entitled to assert such rights. The Court
accordingly does not accept the submission that there exists a constitutional
right for a limited class of persons, which in this case would include the appel-
lant, deducible from their particular personal circumstances.
Id. at para. 115.
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But if a major argument against relaxing the law is that it would not be
possible to frame and police safeguards to prevent euthanasia without
request, and the evidence from jurisdictions which permit voluntary
euthanasia discloses widespread non-voluntary euthanasia, why is that
not relevant?
Moreover, the judgment of Chief Justice Finch also tends to rein-
force concerns about the likelihood of decriminalization promoting
non-voluntary euthanasia both in principle and in practice.  Rejecting
Canada’s submission that “life” in Section 7 of the Charter means physi-
cal life, he concluded:
The meaning of the term “life” in the context of s.7 includes a full
range of potential human experiences.  The value a person
ascribes to his or her life may include physical, intellectual, emo-
tional, cultural and spiritual experiences, the engagement of
one’s senses, intellect and feelings, meeting challenges, enjoying
successes, and accepting or overcoming defeats, forming friend-
ships and other relationships, cooperating, helping others, being
part of a team, enjoying a moment, and anticipating the future
and remembering the past.  Life’s meaning, and by extension the
life interest in s.7, is intimately connected to the way a person val-
ues his or her lived experience.159
He added:
The point at which the meaning of life is lost, when life’s positive
attributes are so diminished as to render life valueless, when suf-
fering overwhelms all else, is an intensely personal decision which
“everyone” has the right to make for him or herself.160
But how is the law to define and determine when “the meaning of life is
lost” and to police such an “intensely personal decision,” and why
should euthanasia not be applied to incompetent patients whose “posi-
tive attributes are so diminished as to render life valueless . . .”?  Rightly,
Justices Newberry and Saunders rejected Chief Justice Finch’s interpre-
tation of “life.”  They observed that those with only a limited ability to
enjoy the experiences listed by him were no less “alive” and had no less
a right to “life” than persons who were able-bodied and fully compe-
tent.161  They concluded:
If “life” were regarded as incorporating various qualities which
some persons enjoy and others do not, the protection of the Char-
ter would be expanded far beyond what the law can “guarantee,”
while conversely, a slippery slope would open up for those who are
unable to enjoy the blessings described by the Chief Justice.162
159. Id. at para. 86.
160. Id.
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IV. FACTUAL FINDINGS OR WISHFUL THINKING?
  Justice Smith concluded that the empirical evidence from jurisdic-
tions where euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide is permitted
shows “differing levels of compliance” with the safeguards.163  This is
some understatement.  The reality is that of the few jurisdictions which
have relaxed their laws, none has demonstrated anything even
approaching effective control.  The best available evidence, that from
the Netherlands, shows that key safeguards have long been widely
breached, and with virtual impunity.  Since 1984, when voluntary, active
euthanasia was declared lawful by the Dutch Supreme Court, the evi-
dence generated by several Dutch government-sponsored surveys has
shown that thousands of patients have been killed without the required
explicit request, and that thousands of euthanasia deaths have been ille-
gally certified by doctors as death by “natural causes.”164  The first offi-
cial survey disclosed that in 1990 there were 2,300 cases of voluntary,
active euthanasia and 400 cases of physician-assisted suicide; that over
80% of these cases went unreported; and that there were a further
1,000 cases of active euthanasia without explicit request (mostly, but by
no means all, involving incompetent patients).165 The evidence from
Belgium paints a similar picture: the common performance of non-vol-
untary, active euthanasia and a frequent failure to report.166  The evi-
dence from Oregon is much more limited: there have been no
comprehensive surveys like those in the Netherlands.  Moreover, the
safeguards in Oregon are in significant respects, not least the absence
of review committees, even laxer than those in the Netherlands and
Belgium. The Oregon law’s safeguards have been aptly described by
leading health lawyer Professor Alexander Capron as “largely
illusory.”167
It is therefore odd that Justice Smith should have concluded that
the evidence shows that the risks “can be very largely avoided through
carefully-designed, well-monitored safeguards.”168  First, no jurisdiction
which permits euthanasia or assisting suicide has “carefully-designed,
well-monitored safeguards.”  The judgment appears to offer no
response to the evidence169 that control in the Netherlands, Belgium
and Oregon cannot be effective because they rely on self-reporting by
163. Id. at para. 9.
164. On the Dutch experience in general see C. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH:
EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991); HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY
DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND ASSISTED SUICIDE (1998); JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETH-
ICS AND PUBLIC POLICY Part III (2002); R. COHEN-ALMAGOR, EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHER-
LANDS: THE POLICY AND PRACTICE OF MERCY KILLING (2004): JOHN GRIFFITHS ET AL.,
EUTHANASIA AND LAW IN EUROPE (2008) Part I .
165. 14% of the 1,000 patients were “totally” competent and a further 11% “partly”
competent. See KEOWN supra note 164, at 104–05, 113. For the results of later surveys see
GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 164 at 180, 199.
166. See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 164 at 332; 341.
167. Alexander M. Capron, Legalizing Physician-Aided Death, CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH-
CARE ETHICS 10 (1996); see also GORSUCH supra note 136, at chapter 7.2.
168. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, at para. 10 (Can. B.C.).
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doctors.  Nor do the guidelines require all candidates for euthanasia or
assisted suicide to consult a psychiatrist or a specialist in palliative
care.170
Secondly, the undisputed empirical evidence from the Netherlands
and Belgium shows widespread breach of the safeguards, not least the
sizeable incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia and of non-report-
ing.171 The judgment’s handling of the Dutch experience172 is particu-
larly unreliable, failing to give adequate attention to the widely-
acknowledged and widespread breaches of the Dutch safeguards since
1984.
Thirdly, the judgment skates over the official condonation of non-
voluntary euthanasia of disabled infants by the Dutch courts and medi-
cal profession,173 and fails even to mention (despite it being cited in
evidence) the repeated criticism of the Dutch by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.174  The judgment also fails to give anything
like adequate attention to important expert committee reports which
have taken full account of the Dutch experience in their unanimous
and considered rejection of euthanasia, not least the reports of the
House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics175 and of the New
York State Task Force.176  The judgment states that there is now much
greater compliance with the requirement to report than there was “pre-
legalization.”177  However, voluntary euthanasia was declared lawful by
the Dutch Supreme Court in 1984—in 2002 the legal guidelines were
essentially translated into statutory form.  The low rate of reporting in
1990 (18%) was, therefore, discovered six years after legalization.  The
fact that the reporting rate rose to 80% in 2005 (three years after the
enactment of the statute) is an improvement, but from a low base, and
obviously had nothing to do with “legalization.”  That 20% of euthana-
sia cases in 2005 year were still being falsely and illegally certified by
physicians as deaths by natural causes,178 and that some 550 patients
170. For other concerns noted in the judgment see id. at para. 405, para. 406, para.
429.
171. For example, evidence from the plaintiff’s own Belgian expert disclosed a
reporting rate of only 52.8% there. Id. at para. 560, para. 564.  The evidence also dis-
closed a substantial incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia: 1.8% of all deaths in Flanders.
Id. at para. at 567. See also id. at para. 657.
172. Id. at para. 455–504.
173. Id. at para. 484.  In two cases in 1996 Dutch appellate courts held lethal injec-
tions for disabled infants lawful in certain circumstances. KEOWN supra note 164, at 119-
20.  In 2005 the Dutch Association for Pediatrics adopted the ‘Groningen Protocol’ for
infanticide. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 164, at 231-233.
174. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, para. 7, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4 (Aug. 25, 2009).
See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Netherlands, para. 5–6, U.N. DOC. CCPR/CO/72/NET (Aug. 27, 2001).
175. House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, H.L.
Paper No. 21-I (1994). (U.K.).
176. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994)
177. Carter v. Canada (Att’y General), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, para. 655 (Can. B.C.).
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were euthanized without the required explicit request,179 is hardly evi-
dence of effective control.  Again, the judge’s conclusion that law
reform in the Netherlands has made considerable progress in achieving
its goals180 depends on what she means by “law reform.”  After legaliza-
tion in 1984, a high incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia and of non-
reporting was detected.  The fact that the numbers have improved since
then is hardly evidence that the relaxation of the law in the Netherlands
has been accompanied by effective control.  It is simply evidence that
matters seem less bad than they were in the half dozen or so years after
legalization.  But the Dutch regime still falls far short of demonstrating
effective control.  If control were so effective, why the criticisms by the
U.N. Human Rights Committee in 2001 and again in 2009?181  The
assertion by Battin that the empirical data from the Netherlands “dem-
onstrates that no or little substantive abuse has occurred”182 bears little
relation to the disturbing reality disclosed by the Dutch surveys, unless
she entertains the peculiar view that non-voluntary euthanasia is not a
“substantive abuse.”
Fourthly, the judgment attaches considerable significance to a
paper by Battin et al purporting to show no statistical evidence of
heightened risk to “vulnerable groups” in the Netherlands and Ore-
gon.183  However, to show that the proportion of, say, elderly people
who were euthanized or assisted in suicide was no greater than the pro-
portion of elderly dying naturally does not show that those euthanized
or assisted in suicide were not pressured or depressed.  Moreover, as
Battin et al. properly recognize, “full examination of practice in Oregon
would require studies of the complexity, duration and comprehensive-
ness of the four Dutch nationwide studies.”184  The judge, despite rec-
ognizing the limitations of self-reporting, and the doubts about
compliance with the requirement of referral to a mental health profes-
sional of patients suspected to be suffering from mental disorder or
depression,185 concluded that the Oregon law is working “fairly
well.”186  Given the absence of comprehensive surveys, such a judgment
is surely unwarranted.  And even if there were an absence of reported
abuse, absence of evidence of abuse is not evidence of absence of abuse.
The judge also observed that the Oregon data supported the evidence
of a Dutch expert, Dr. van Delden, that it is possible to design a system
that protects vulnerable individuals and groups.187  The evidence from
Oregon is, again, insufficient to support that conclusion, and the evi-
dence from the Netherlands and Belgium goes the other way.
179. Id. at 180.
180. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 660.
181. See supra note 174.
182. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 661.
183. Id. at para. 621–36; Margaret Pabst Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in
Oregon and the Netherlands: Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable Groups”,
33 J. MED. ETHICS 591 (2007).
184. Carter, [2012] 886 B.C.S.C. at para. 635.
185. Id. at para. 649; see also infra text accompanying note 209.
186. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 653.
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The judge concluded that the experience in Oregon is more likely
to be predictive of what would happen in Canada if a permissive regime
were put in place, though she acknowledged that even in relation to
Oregon “only a weak inference can be drawn.”188  Moreover, if only a
weak inference can be drawn from the experience in Oregon, a juris-
diction which does not permit voluntary euthanasia, what is the sup-
posed basis of the judge’s conclusion that the empirical evidence shows
that the risks associated with euthanasia “can be very largely avoided
through carefully-designed, well-monitored safeguards?”189  The judge
concluded that, “the expert opinion evidence from persons who have
done research into the question is that, with respect to all three jurisdic-
tions, the predicted abuse and disproportionate impact on vulnerable
populations has not materialized.”190  This ignores expert evidence to
the contrary which was placed before the court, and which is consistent
with the concerns raised by other researchers who were not called as
experts.191  The judge also concluded that empirical researchers and
practitioners with experience in those jurisdictions conclude that their
systems work well in protecting patients from abuse.192  But how can
any system be said to “work well” when it relies on self-reporting or is
associated with a sizeable incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia and of
non-reporting?  Or when, like the Dutch, its failings are recognized by
bodies including the United Nations Human Rights Committee?  The
judgment does not say.
V. FLEMING V. IRELAND
In Fleming v Ireland,193 a case broadly similar to Carter, a woman
with multiple sclerosis wanted to avail herself of assisted suicide at a
time of her choosing.  She challenged the constitutionality of Ireland’s
prohibition on assisting suicide, contained in section 2(2) of the Crimi-
nal Law (Suicide) Act 1993, and sought a declaration of incompatibility
pursuant to section 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights
Act 2003.194  Mirroring the Suicide Act 1961 in England, the Criminal
188. Id. at para. 683.
189. Id. at para. 10.
190. Id. at para. 684.
191. See e.g., R. COHEN-ALMAGOR, EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE POLICY AND
PRACTICE OF MERCY KILLING (2004);
192. Carter, [2012] B.C.S.C. 886 at para. 685.
193. Fleming v. Ireland [2013] I.E.H.C. 2 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), aff’d, Supreme Court
[2013] I.E.S.C. 19.
194. In the alternative, she sought an order directing the third defendant, the
Director of Public Prosecutions, to issue guidelines stating the factors taken into account
in deciding whether to prosecute or consent to prosecute anyone who assisted the plain-
tiff to commit suicide. Id. at 3(3).  The court, distinguishing R. (Purdy) v. Dir. of Pub.
Prosections, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (Eng.), rejected this claim. See Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at
para. 126–75.  For criticism of Purdy see KEOWN, supra note 22, at 301–07.
The challenge to the law in Fleming was narrower than that in Carter in that the plain-
tiff did not challenge the prohibition on euthanasia, but wider in that she challenged the
law prohibiting anyone, physician or layperson, from assisting suicide. The essence of her
claim was distilled by Chief Justice Denham in the Supreme Court: that disabled persons
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Law (Suicide) Act 1993 abolished the crime of suicide but punishes,
with a maximum of fourteen years’ imprisonment, aiding, abetting,
counseling, or procuring suicide or an attempt by another to commit
suicide.195  The plaintiff invoked Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitu-
tion, which provides: “The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as
best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindi-
cate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citi-
zen.”196  She argued that insofar as it protected her “person” this
necessarily embraced decisions concerning her personal welfare,
including medical treatment.197  The State could not prescribe an
orthodoxy in respect of life choices of this fundamental nature, and
individual choices of this kind taken by competent adults must normally
be respected absent compelling reasons to the contrary.198
The Divisional Court of the High Court199 considered that insofar
as the plaintiff advanced a conscientious and considered decision to
seek the assistance of others to take active steps to end her own life “in
the face of a terminal illness which has ravaged her body and rendered
her life one of almost complete misery,” that such a decision “is in prin-
ciple engaged by the right to personal autonomy which lies at the core
of the protection of the person by Article 40.3.2.”200  However, the
court said it chose the words “in principle” carefully, as there were
“powerful countervailing considerations” which fully justified the legis-
lature in prohibiting assisting suicide.  It added:
Like Rehnquist C.J. in Glucksberg, the Court believes there is a real
and defining difference between a competent adult making the
decision not to continue medical treatment on the one hand—
even if death is the natural, imminent and foreseeable conse-
quence of that decision—and the taking of active steps by another to
bring about the end of that life of the other.  The former gener-
ally involves the passive acceptance of the natural process of dying,
a fate that will ultimately confront us all, whereas the latter
involves the active ending of the life of another—a totally different
matter.201
It went on:
If this Court could be satisfied that it would be possible to tailor-
make a solution which would address the needs of Ms. Fleming
alone without any possible implications for third parties or society at
large, there might be a good deal to be said in favour of her case.
express their wishes, should not be prevented from being assisted to commit suicide.
Fleming, [2013] I.E.S.C. at para. 23.
195. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at para. 4.
196. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Histori-
cal_Information/The_Constitution/.
197. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at para. 49.
198. Id. at para. 50.
199. Comprising the President of the High Court (Kearns) and Justices Carney and
Hogan.
200. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at para. 52 (emphasis in original).
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But this Court cannot be so satisfied.  It certainly cannot devise
some form of legislative solution which would be an impermissible
function for the Court.  Further, the Court is mindful that any
legislative solution would have to be of general application and this
is true a fortiori of any judicial decision which the Court might be
called upon to make.202
  Even with legislative safeguards “serious objections and concerns
remain.”203  There was the risk of misdiagnosis of terminal illness;204 of
mistaken prognosis;205 the subjective nature of the ‘intolerability’ of
pain;206 and that pain ranked low in the motivational hierarchy of those
seeking assisted suicide.207  Although the study by Battin et al. con-
cluded that the evidence from the Netherlands and Oregon did not
show that potentially vulnerable groups were in fact vulnerable to pres-
sure, the relevance of some of those groups in the context of physician-
assisted suicide was open to question.  The court noted that, in their
reply to that study, Professors Ilora Finlay and Rob George had argued
that socioeconomic categories are not necessarily a proxy for vulnera-
bility.208  The court could not, moreover, overlook the fact that one of
the co-authors of the Battin study, Professor Ganzini, had herself
expressed doubts about the absence of appropriate safeguards in the
Oregon law.  Moreover, Professor George had given evidence, as an
expert for Ireland, that the 2011 report from the Oregon Department
of Public Health had shown that the referral rate for psychiatric evalua-
tion for those who had ended their lives by physician-assisted suicide
was just 1.4%.209
Moreover, Ganzini’s study found that of eighteen patients who had
received physician assistance in suicide, three had been suffering from
clinical depression which had not been diagnosed or been the subject
of independent psychiatric evaluation.210  Just as importantly, the court
continued, the Battin study did not address the concerns powerfully
expressed by the two expert witnesses led by the State—palliative care
physicians Dr. Tony O’Brien and Professor Rob George—that under a
relaxed regime certain categories of patients with no visible sign of
depression and who did not belong to any of the traditional categories
of vulnerable patients would place themselves under pressure to hasten
their death in this fashion in a subtle manner that might often escape
detection.211  George had observed that, while overt pressure on indi-
viduals to end their lives would likely be uncommon, much more com-
mon were the signals that relatives and others can send, albeit
202. Id. at para. 55 (emphasis in original).
203. Id. at para. 57.
204. Id.
205. Id. at para. 59.
206. Id. at para. 60.
207. Id.
208. Id. at para. 61.
209. Id. at para. 62.
210. Id. at para. 63.
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unconsciously, to a seriously ill family member that he or she has
become a burden on the family or that family life has become disrupted
by their illness.  There was such a thing as “care fatigue” even in loving
family environments, and it was easy for seriously ill people to feel a
sense of obligation to remove themselves from the scene.212  The court
concluded: “Of the evidence given in this case, the Court prefers that
offered by the State.”213  It added:
The predominant thrust of the expert evidence offered by Dr.
O’Brien and Professor George to the effect that relaxing the ban
on assisting suicide would bring about a paradigm shift with
unforeseeable (and perhaps uncontrollable) changes in attitude
and behavior to assisted suicide struck the Court as compelling
and deeply worrying.  The Court was particularly impressed by the
evidence given by these two witnesses based as they are on many
years of clinical experience in dealing with and treating terminally
ill patients.  The Court finds the evidence of these witnesses,
whether taken together or separately, more convincing than that
tendered by Professor Battin, not least because of the somewhat
limited nature of the studies and categories of person studied by
Professor Battin but also because the views of the State’s witnesses
are rooted in their solid clinical experience of dealing with liter-
ally thousands of terminally ill patients and both gave their evi-
dence in a manner which greatly impressed the Court.
It concluded:
The Court finds that the State has provided an ample evidential
basis to support the view that any relaxation of the ban on assisted
suicide would be impossible to tailor to individual cases and would
be inimical to the public interest in protecting the most vulnera-
ble members of society.214
  The court noted that a further point of some importance was that
relaxation of the law would compromise, perhaps in a fundamental and
far-reaching way, that which was rightly regarded as an essential ingredi-
ent of a civilized society committed to the protection of human life and
dignity.  It might well send out a subliminal message to particular vul-
nerable groups, such as the disabled and the elderly, that in order to
avoid consuming scarce resources in an era of shrinking public funds
for healthcare, physician-assisted suicide was a normal option which any
rational patient faced with terminal or degenerative illness should con-
sider.215 And this was quite apart from other considerations to which
the legislature could properly attach great weight, such as the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the medical profession as healers, and of deter-
ring suicide and anything that smacks of the “normalisation” of
suicide.216  It was idle to suggest that even the consensual taking of
212. Id. at para. 66.
213. Id. at para. 67.
214. Id.
215. Id. at para. 68.
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another’s life would not involve the risk of the physician becoming
accustomed to the new paradigm, and the risks of complacency with
regard to the maintenance of safeguards could not be discounted as
negligible.217  In that regard, one had to have regard to the Dutch data,
which showed a lack of control, and that non-voluntary euthanasia was a
serious problem.218  The Dutch experience showed that the risks were
real and could not be dismissed as speculative, and, just as seriously, the
dilution of the statutory ban might over time lead to the unintentional
erosion of moral and legal standards among medical practitioners.219
It was true, added the court, that under the law’s proportionality
analysis, a complete statutory ban which overrode or significantly inter-
fered with a constitutional right required compelling justification, espe-
cially in the case of intimate choices in relation to profound issues
touching on personal autonomy. Nevertheless, the court thought the
legislature “fully entitled” to enact the ban on assisting suicide, not least
when regard was had to the wider public policy considerations and to
the duty imposed by Article 40.3.2 to safeguard the right to life.220  The
State had a “profound and overwhelming interest in protecting the
sanctity of all human life”: this was an express and solemn commitment
contained in Article 40.3.2.  In conjunction with the equality guarantee
in Article 40.1, “it commits the State to valuing equally the life of all
persons.”221  The court continued:
In the eyes of the Constitution, the last days of life of an elderly,
terminally ill and disabled patient facing death have the same
value, possess the same intrinsic human dignity and naturally
enjoy the same protection as the life of the healthy young person
on the cusp of adulthood and in the prime of their life. These are,
of course, concerns which any free and democratic society must
strive to protect and uphold.222
  The prohibition on assisting suicide was rationally connected to this
fundamental objective of protecting life and was “not remotely based
on arbitrary, unfair or irrational considerations.”223  If the court were to
unravel a thread of the law by even the most limited constitutional adju-
dication in the plaintiff’s favor, it would, or at least might, open a Pan-
dora’s Box, placing the lives of others at risk. Such might well be the
effect of relaxation,
specifically because of the inability of even the most rigorous sys-
tem of legislative checks and balances to ensure, in particular, that
the aged, the disabled, the poor, the unwanted, the rejected, the
lonely, the impulsive, the financially compromised and the emo-
tionally vulnerable would not disguise their own personal prefer-
217. Id.
218. Id. at para. 70.
219. Id. at para. 71.
220. Id. at para. 72.
221. Id. at para. 74 (emphasis in original).
222. Id.
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ences and elect to hasten death so as to avoid a sense of being a
burden on family and society.224
The safeguards built into any liberalized system would, furthermore, be
vulnerable to laxity and complacency and might well prove difficult or
even impossible to police adequately.225  For all these reasons, the
court held that the blanket ban satisfied the requirement of
proportionality.
The court proceeded to consider the comparative legal authorities.
It observed that, apart from the judgment of Justice Smith in Carter,
there was “near judicial unanimity” on the constitutionality of blanket
bans on assisting suicide.226  In particular, every appellate court had
stressed as compelling the considerations which had persuaded the
Irish Divisional Court to uphold the law.227  The U.S. Supreme Court in
Glucksberg had noted the State’s interest in protecting vulnerable
groups, including the poor, the elderly, and the disabled from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes, and in protecting the disabled and dying from
prejudice, negative stereotypes, and societal indifference.228  It had
observed that the blanket ban “reflects and reinforces its policy that the
lives of terminally ill, disabled and elderly people must be no less valued
than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled
person’s suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same
way as anyone else’s.”229  The U.S. Supreme Court had also noted that
the state may fear that permitting assisted suicide would start it down
the path to euthanasia with and even without consent.  If suicide was a
right, it was a right enjoyed by every man and woman and could not be
limited to competent, terminally ill adults, and the decision of a duly
appointed surrogate decision maker was for legal purposes the decision
of the patient.230  A limited right to physician-assisted suicide was likely,
in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult
to police and contain.231  This concern was further supported, the U.S.
Supreme Court had added, by evidence from the Netherlands, where
the Dutch government’s own survey had disclosed 1,000 cases of eutha-
nasia without explicit request, and the euthanasia of disabled neonates
and demented elderly.232  The Irish Divisional Court also noted that in
the companion case of Vacco v. Quill, the U.S. Supreme Court had
rejected the argument that the distinction between refusing lifesaving
treatment and assisted suicide was arbitrary: by permitting everyone to
refuse unwanted treatment, while prohibiting everyone from assisting
224. Id. at para. 76.
225. Id.
226. Id. at para. 78.
227. Id.
228. Id. at para. 81. See supra note 131.
229. Id. at para. 81.
230. Id.  See supra note 157.
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suicide, the law was, the Supreme Court had noted, following a long-
standing and rational distinction.233
Turning to the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Rodri-
guez, the Irish Divisonal Court noted that Justice Sopinka had held that
the blanket ban had a “clearly pressing and substantial legislative objec-
tive grounded in the respect for and the desire to protect human life, a
fundamental Charter value.”234  On the question of proportionality, he
had observed that to introduce an exception would create inequality,
and that attempts to create exceptions had tended to support the the-
ory of the “slippery slope”: “The formulation of safeguards to prevent
excesses has been unsatisfactory and has failed to allay fears that a relax-
ation of the clear standard set by the law will undermine the protection
of life and will lead to abuses of the exception.”235  There was no half-
way house, he had concluded, which would achieve the legislation’s
purpose because the purpose extended to the protection of the lives of
the terminally ill, partly by discouraging them from choosing death,
and because there was no assurance that the exception could be made
to limit the taking of life to those who are terminally ill and genuinely
desire death.236  The Irish court observed that Justice Sopinka’s analysis
of the proportionality issue concurred with its own.237
It noted also that the European Court of Human Rights had
affirmed, in Pretty, the U.K.’s blanket ban on assisting suicide, conclud-
ing that “[c]lear risks of abuse do exist, notwithstanding arguments as
to the possibility of safeguards and protective procedures,”238 and that
in Haas v. Switzerland239 it had observed that “the risks of abuse inher-
ent in a system that facilitates access to assisted suicide cannot be
underestimated.”240
What of Carter?  The Irish Divisional Court noted that Justice Smith
had given two reasons for holding the Canadian ban to be unconstitu-
tional: subsequent development in the proportionality analysis, and evi-
dence from jurisdictions with relaxed laws which had not been available
to the Supreme Court in Rodriguez.241  While the Irish court thought it
would be inappropriate to comment on the first, it did address the sec-
ond.  In light of the evidence that had been presented to Justice Smith,
and to it, the court disagreed with her analysis and conclusions.242
233. Id. at para. 83.  The Irish Divisional Court expressed its entire agreement with
the views of the U.S. Supreme Court it quoted from Glucksberg and Vacco. Id. at para. 84.




238. Id. at para. 109.
239. 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33 (2011).
240. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at para. 118.
241. Id. at para. 90.  Evidence about the failure of Dutch control, including the first
Dutch survey disclosing the 1,000 cases of non-voluntary euthanasia in 1990, was available
well before Rodriguez was decided, and amply warranted Justice Sopinka’s concern about
the “worrisome” trend the evidence revealed.  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.)
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 603 (Can.). And, as we shall see, the subsequent evidence persuaded
the Irish Divisional Court to agree not with Justice Smith but with Justice Sopinka.





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 25 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE101.txt unknown Seq: 39  7-MAY-14 15:32
2014] A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA? 39
First, it was true that similar issues of informed consent attended,
on the one hand, the decision of a seriously ill patient to refuse life-
sustaining treatment and, on the other, physician-assisted suicide.  How-
ever, the similarity ended there, since for the reasons the Divisonal
Court had set out, there was an “enormous and defining” difference
between the two.243  The latter involved active participation in the
intentional killing of another, even if freely consensual.244  Secondly,
the Divisional Court could not agree that the accumulated evidence
from other jurisdictions supported Justice Smith’s conclusion that “the
risks inherent in legally permitted death have not materialized in the
manner that may have been predicted.”245  It added:
Neither the evidence tendered at the hearing before us or the
evidence given before Lynn Smith J. regarding contemporary
practice in either the Netherlands or Belgium can be regarded as
encouraging or satisfactory. After all, it was not in dispute but that
in 2005—the year for which the latest data is available for the
Netherlands—560 patients (some 0.4% of all deaths) were
euthanized without having given their explicit consent.246
Moreover, the corresponding figure for Belgium was apparently higher,
“as 1.9% of all deaths which took place in the entirety of Flanders
between June and November 2007 were without explicit request.”247
The corresponding figure for Switzerland was also high: “almost 1% of
all deaths.”248  Justice Smith had also noted that evidence was given that
in some cases euthanasia without request is lawful in the Nether-
lands.249  In short, observed the Divisional Court, the evidence showed
that the incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Switzerland is “strikingly high.”250  Further, the evidence
before Justice Smith also showed that “family burden” was more often
cited as a reason for non-voluntary euthanasia, and that non-voluntary
euthanasia predominated in respect of the elderly who were in a coma
or demented, that is, “precisely one of the vulnerable groups most at
risk.”251  Her finding that relaxation of the law did not disproportion-
ately impact vulnerable groups such as the elderly or those with disabili-
ties had to be measured against this evidence, as well as the evidence
(apparently accepted by her) that disabled neonates were not infre-
quently euthanized in the Netherlands.252  The Divisional Court con-
cluded, “Against that general background, the Court cannot at all agree
with [Justice Lynn Smith’s] finding that the risks inherent in legally
permitted assisted death have not materialized in jurisdictions such as
243. Id. at para. 93.
244. Id.
245. Id. at para. 94.
246. Id. at para. 96 (emphasis in original).
247. Id. at para. 99 (emphasis in original).
248. Id. (emphasis in original).
249. Id. at para. 97.
250. Id. at para. 102.
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Belgium and the Netherlands.”253  The court went on that, while it
agreed with her that scrutiny of physician-assisted suicide would have to
be “at the highest level,” she herself acknowledged that, more than
thirty years after relaxation of the law, compliance with essential safe-
guards in the Netherlands was “not yet at an ideal level.”254  The Divi-
sional Court added:
In fact, it might well be said that this is altogether too sanguine a
view and that the fact that such a strikingly high level of legally
assisted deaths without explicit request occurs in countries such as
Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland without any obvious official
or even popular concern speaks for itself as to the risks involved in
any such liberalisation.255
The Divisional Court preferred the reasoning of Justice Sopinka in
Rodriguez.256
The Divisional Court noted that the preponderance of judicial
opinion in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
European Court of Human Rights had been to uphold a blanket ban
for the same or substantially the same reason as it had set out.  “Specifi-
cally, experience has shown that it would be all but impossible effec-
tively to protect the lives of vulnerable persons and to guard against the
risks of abuses were the law to be relaxed.”257  No appellate court had
upheld the claims of a litigant in the plaintiff’s position because it was
impossible to craft a solution specific to the needs of a plaintiff such as
Ms. Fleming without jeopardizing an essential fabric of the legal system,
namely, respect for human life, and compromising these protections
for others and other groups of individuals who sorely need such protec-
tions.258  The court was “prepared to allow” that insofar as the blanket
ban failed to make separate provision for persons in the plaintiff’s posi-
tion by creating no exception to take account of the physical disability
which prevented her from taking the steps which the able-bodied could
take, the precept of equality in Article 40.1 was engaged.259  However,
for all the reasons it had given for rejecting her claim under Article
253. Id. at para. 104. Even if it is true, the court added, that the incidence of non-
voluntary euthanasia has significantly declined since the law was relaxed. Id. For criticism
of the claim that the incidence has in fact declined since legalization. See supra notes
177–81.
254. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at para. 104.
255. Id. Although this Article is concerned with the evidence presented in Carter
and Fleming, it is worth noting that the euthanasia experience in Belgium has since been
attracting increasing publicity, concerning the use of organs from euthanized patients;
the euthanasia of deaf twins; of a transsexual person; and the enactment of legislation to
permit euthanasia for children. See Simon Caldwell, Organs of those killed by euthanasia
being used, DAILY TELEGRAPH (June 14, 2011); Deaf Belgian twins end lives as they start going
blind, BBC (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21039064; Belgian
helped to die after three sex change operations, BBC (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-24373107; Belgian parliament votes through child euthanasia, BBC (Feb.
13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26181615.
256. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C. at para. 105.
257. Id. at para. 119.
258. Id. at para. 120.





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 26 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE101.txt unknown Seq: 41  7-MAY-14 15:32
2014] A RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA? 41
40.3.2, it considered the differential treatment amply justified.  There
was, moreover, a profound difference between the law permitting an
adult to take their own life and sanctioning another to assist that person
to take their own life.260  The decision of the Divisional Court was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ireland.261
Demonstrating an impressive familiarity with the comparative legal
authorities and with the empirical evidence, the judgment of the Divi-
sional Court in Fleming confirms the eccentric and erroneous nature of
the judgment of Justice Smith in Carter.  This is not to suggest that Flem-
ing is itself free from difficulty.  First, it held that the plaintiff’s rights
under Article 40.3.2 were engaged by the State’s prohibition on assist-
ing suicide, which prohibition then required justification.262  However,
the ban on assisting suicide implements the requirements of that Article.
Article 40.3.2 provides, it will be recalled,263 that the State shall “protect
as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done,
vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citi-
zen.”  The ban protects the lives of citizens from unjust attack, not only
those who may not freely wish to die (for whom the court showed a
commendable concern) but even those who may.  The court did not
appear to appreciate that, while autonomy is indeed an important
human capacity, and part of our dignity, not all exercises of autonomy
engage constitutional protection, and certainly not those aimed at self-
destruction (or self-mutilation, or selling oneself into slavery . . .).
Indeed, not only may the State prohibit assisting suicide, there is a
strong argument that it must do so, at least if it is to comply with Article
40.3.2 and protect the life of each citizen from unjust attack; with Arti-
cle 40.3.1, by which the State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as
far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights
of the citizen; and with Article 40.1 which guarantees the equality of
each person before the law.  In its review of the comparative authorities,
the court cited the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.264  In that case, the Supreme
Court assumed that there is a liberty to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment.  The law rightly protects such exercises of autonomy.  But an
Article 40.1 provides, “All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law.
This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard
to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function.”
260. Fleming, [2013] I.E.H.C at para. 122.
261. Fleming v. Ireland [2013] I.E.S.C. 19.
262. See supra text accompanying note 200.  Similarly, the European Court of
Human Rights reasoned in Pretty that because the United Kingdom’s ban on assisting
suicide prevented the applicant from exercising her choice to avoid what she considered
would be an undignified end to her life, the court was “not prepared to exclude “that the
ban interfered with her right to respect for her private life under Article 8(1) of the
European Convention.  Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 67 (2002).
The Law Lords were on surer ground in holding that there was nothing in Article 8(1) to
suggest that it protected the choice to live no longer.  R. (Pretty) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecu-
tions, [2001] U.K.H.L. 61, para. 23 [2002] 1 A.C. 800.
263. See supra note 196.
264. Fleming, [2013] IEHC 2 at para. 54 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health,
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autonomous choice to refuse treatment which is futile or too burden-
some (a choice historically protected by the law) is quite different from
a choice to be helped to kill oneself (a choice historically prohibited by
the law). Cruzan is authority for the former, not the latter.  A legal pro-
hibition on refusing treatment would conflict with a long-recognized
right; a prohibition on assisting suicide conflicts with no right, long-
recognized or otherwise.
A second and overlapping criticism of Fleming is that the Divisional
Court treated the distinction between the right to refuse treatment and
the claimed right to assistance in suicide in terms of “the taking of
active steps” by a third party to bring about the death of another.265
This was mistaken.  For the key to understanding the law relating to the
protection of human life is the distinction between intention and fore-
sight, not the distinction between acts and omissions.  Assisting suicide
(and euthanasia) often involve the taking of active steps, but not always.
The court should have held that the claim in Fleming failed not because
it would have involved active assistance in suicide, but because it would
have involved intentional assistance in suicide.
A third criticism is that the court was “prepared to allow” that inso-
far as the blanket ban failed to make separate provision for persons in
the plaintiff’s position by creating no exception to take account of the
physical disability which prevented her from taking the steps which the
able-bodied could take, the precept of equality in Article 40.1 was
engaged.266  The fragile nature of such reasoning was explained in Part
II of this Article.
CONCLUSIONS
The judgment of Justice Lynn Smith in Carter is profoundly flawed.
It fails accurately to articulate or to affirm the fundamental legal princi-
ple of the inviolability of life, a principle which has long provided an
ethical, intelligible, and workable bright line, historically endorsed by
the criminal law and by professional medical ethics, prohibiting the
intentional shortening of patients’ lives and the intentional assistance
or encouragement of suicide.  By blurring the key distinction between
trying to shorten life and merely foreseeing the shortening of life, the
judgment both misunderstands and undermines that principle.  Moreo-
ver, the principles the judgment adopts at its expense—an exaggerated
deference to autonomy and an understanding of beneficence which
holds that some lives are “not worth living,” that some patients would be
“better off dead”—would justify the ending of the lives of patients, both
competent and incompetent, in a broad range of cases.  The judg-
ment’s cursory dismissal of the logical “slippery slope” argument is par-
ticularly difficult to defend.
The judgment’s analysis of the regulation of euthanasia and assist-
ing suicide, in those few jurisdictions with relaxed laws, is no sounder
265. See supra text accompanying notes 201, 244.
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than its analysis of legal and ethical principle.  The experience of the
Netherlands and Belgium discloses widespread breach of key guide-
lines, with virtual impunity, not least the frequent practice of non-vol-
untary euthanasia.  The safeguards in Oregon are in significant respects
even laxer, and Oregon awaits the sort of comprehensive surveys car-
ried out by the Dutch, surveys which have exposed the persistent failure
of their guidelines to cabin voluntary euthanasia.  Justice Smith’s key
finding that the evidence shows that the risks of decriminalization “can
be very largely avoided through carefully-designed, well-monitored safe-
guards”267 is very wide of the mark.  In short, Carter rejects a founda-
tional ethical principle of the criminal law and misrepresents the
disturbing and widely-recognized reality of practice in those few juris-
dictions which have abandoned it.
In Bland Lord Goff stated:
It is of course well known that there are many responsible mem-
bers of our society who believe that euthanasia should be made
lawful: but that result could, I believe, only be achieved by legisla-
tion which expresses the democratic will that so fundamental a
change should be made in our law, and can, if enacted, ensure
that such legalised killing can only be carried out subject to appro-
priate supervision and control.268
  Reflecting this proper and prudent approach, the highest courts in
Canada, the United States, England, and Ireland, together with the
European Court of Human Rights, have deferred to legislatures to
resolve a matter—involving as it does questions of ethics, clinical judg-
ment, and social policy—that is paradigmatically suited to legislative
deliberation. Carter illustrates the dangers of judges, not least in expe-
dited hearings,269 making mistaken factual findings, findings at odds
with those of expert committees.  Legislatures are not constrained by
the circumstances, not least the possible urgency of an individual case
and the expertise of individual counsel.  They are also able to appoint
expert committees to assist their deliberations.  The dangers of judges
deciding the issue are only compounded by the reluctance of appellate
courts to review a trial judge’s findings of fact.  Chief Justice Finch
267. See supra text accompanying note 2.
268. Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, 865 (H.L.) (Eng.).  Similarly,
in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the
judicial need for the utmost care in accepting a right to physician-assisted suicide; that
such acceptance would place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative
action, and that the court’s rejection of such a right permitted the debate to continue, “as
it should in a democratic society.” Id. at 735.  Delivering the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ireland in Fleming, Chief Justice Denham stated that the legislation prohibiting
assisting suicide called for “a careful assessment of competing and complex social and
moral considerations.” She added: “That is an assessment which legislative branches of
government are uniquely well placed to undertake.”  Fleming v Ireland, [2013] I.E.S.C.
19, para. 96. See also id. at para. 107.
269. Both Carter and Fleming were fast-tracked. Carter proceeded by way of a sum-
mary trial application and counsel were required to operate under “fairly short timelines.”
Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2012] B.C.S.C. 886, para. 114 (Can. B.C.).  The proceed-
ings in Fleming were instituted on October 25, 2012, and the case was heard on December
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observed in Carter that, while findings based on social and legislative
facts together with the testimony of live witnesses are not subject to the
ordinary “palpable and overriding error” standard on review, they are
owed some level of deference.270  The erroneous nature of the key fac-
tual finding in Carter is palpable and overriding but, had it been less so,
and had Justice Smith’s judgment not been reversed because of her
misunderstanding of disproportionality, it is not difficult to imagine an
appellate court granting it deference.  A single judge’s flawed interpre-
tation of the empirical evidence could then have had the most
profound consequences for Canadian law, medicine, and society.
In the Court of Appeal, Justices Newberry and Saunders briefly
considered obiter the possibility of granting a constitutional exemption
in the case of “a generally sound law that has an extraordinary, even
cruel, effect on a small number of individuals.”271  They remarked that
the issue of physician-assisted suicide has surfaced repeatedly in Parlia-
ment “without result one way or another.”272  While one shares their
sympathy for those whose suffering cannot be completely alleviated by
modern palliative medicine and social support, their suggestion that
this might justify a constitutional exemption is highly problematic.
First, would it be proper for a statute enacted by the democrati-
cally-elected legislature, and upheld as constitutional by the courts, to
be nullified by the courts, even in a “small number” of cases?  Moreo-
ver, what would qualify the courts to make exceptions, not least when
any exception has grave implications for society, implications an ade-
quate understanding of which requires familiarity with the arguments
and evidence canvassed by expert bodies, in Canada and beyond, which
have exhaustively considered the issue and which have overwhelmingly
decided against the making of any exception?  Further, although Jus-
tices Newberry and Saunders claimed that the issue has been repeatedly
raised in the legislature “without result one way or another,” does not
this claim simply close its eyes to the plain fact that there has been a
result: the repeated rejection of attempts to create exceptions?273
Secondly, Justices Newberry and Saunders claimed that the prohi-
bition against assisting suicide is concerned with the protection of the
vulnerable and that “[l]ifting the prohibition for those who are clear-
minded, supported in their life-expectancy by medical opinion, rational
and without outside influence, and protected by a court process, might
not undermine the legislative intention. . . .”274  But, as we will recall,
the purpose of the prohibition on assisting suicide is not only to protect
270. Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) [2013] B.C.C.A. at para. 151.
271. Id. at para. 326.
272. Id. at para. 334.
273. As recently as 2010, “Bill C-384,” a private member’s bill to decriminalize
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, was rejected by the Canadian Parliament by 228
votes to 59. Assisted suicide voted down by MPs, CBCNEWS (Apr. 21, 2010, 11:42 PM), http:/
/www.cbc.ca/news/canada/assisted-suicide-voted-down-by-mps-1.910839.
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the vulnerable: it is to affirm the inviolability of the lives of all, “vulnera-
ble” or not.275
Thirdly, could a constitutional exemption be limited to a “small
number” of individuals? Are there not numerous individuals, with suf-
fering of various types and degrees, and with varying degrees of life-
expectancy (suffering will be more protracted the longer one’s life-
expectancy), who might claim an exemption?  According to what crite-
ria would the judges distinguish between the “deserving” and the
“undeserving”?  And, if certain individuals who requested an exemption
on account of their suffering were accommodated, why deny an exemp-
tion to an incompetent person suffering to the same (or greater)
extent, whose representative applied for an exemption on their behalf?
Fourthly, leaving aside the problem of defining the limits of any
exemption, would euthanasia in practice be performed only when sanc-
tioned by a court?  If many Dutch doctors ignore even the “light touch”
regulation required of them, why should we expect many Canadian
doctors to subject themselves, and their patients, to the more formal,
time-consuming, and arduous process of euthanasia by constitutional
exemption?  The mechanism of a constitutional exemption escapes
none of the key objections to relaxing the law which have been identi-
fied by expert committees, objections which ground statutory blanket
bans on euthanasia and assisting suicide, bans which have been repeat-
edly upheld by appellate courts.
In conclusion, nothing in the judgment of Justice Smith in Carter
(or in the dissenting judgment of Chief Justice Finch in the Court of
Appeal) should give the Supreme Court of Canada cause to overrule its
decision in Rodriguez, a decision the soundness of which has been
repeatedly affirmed, and whose soundness is significantly reinforced by
the manifest unsoundness of the argumentation in Carter for overruling
it.
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